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1. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
2. See id. at 115.  In Firestone, the Supreme Court used the terminology “arbitrary and
capricious” as developed in labor law cases, rather than the “abuse of discretion” terminology
incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959).  Like most courts, this article uses
the terms interchangeably.  See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1003-04
n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005); Cox v. Mid-America
Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1558 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); see
also Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 215 & nn.5-6 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing cases, but reserving question whether abuse of discretion standard is equivalent
to or less strict than the arbitrary and capricious standard).  But see Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000); Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000) and in scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.).  A selected history of ERISA, beginning in January 1973 with the
introduction of H.R. 2, 93d Cong. (1973), and S. 4, 93d Cong. (1973), the bills which ultimately
formed the basis of the final legislation, is compiled in a three-volume committee print.  See 1-3
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGIS.
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
4. Trust law generally requires courts to defer to the decisions of a non-conflicted trustee
acting within the scope of its discretionary authority, even if the court believes the trustee acted
wrongly, as long as the trustee did not abuse its discretion.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 187 (1959) (“Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse
by the trustee of his discretion.”).  Under this trust law “abuse of discretion” review standard,
a court will not interfere with a trustee’s discretionary choice “unless the trustee . . . acts
dishonestly, or with an improper even though not a dishonest motive, or fails to use his
judgment, or acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.”  Id. § 187 cmt. e; see, e.g.,
Morton, 91 F.3d at 870 (“A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is ‘not just
clearly incorrect but downright unreasonable.’” (quoting Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055,
1058 (7th Cir. 1990))); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d
521, 529 (7th Cir. 1986) (“When [discretionary power] has been conferred, the judicial role is
limited to determining whether the . . . [Committee’s] interpretation was made rationally and
in good faith — not whether it was [correct].” (quotation omitted)); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d
1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that courts defer to the discretionary actions of a trustee so
long as its conduct is not “arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith, not supported by
substantial evidence, or [is] erroneous on a question of law.”).  In the Tenth Circuit, see Cirulis
v. UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003) (“When reviewing under the arbitrary
I. Preface
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court triggered an avalanche of
continuing litigation when the Court announced in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch  that, where a plan sponsor empowers the administrator with1
discretionary authority to interpret plan provisions and to determine eligibility
for benefits,  trial judges should review ERISA  claim denials under a trust2 3
law-based deferential standard.  The Court relied upon the Restatement4
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and capricious standard . . . the [administrator’s] decision will be upheld unless it is not
grounded on any reasonable basis.  The reviewing court need only assure that the
administrator’s decision fall[s] somewhere on a continuum of reasonableness — even if on the
low end.”) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
5. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d
(alteration in original)); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 319 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “conflict
of interest” as “[a] real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s
public or fiduciary duties”).
6. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[Firestone states that] ‘if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who
is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a “factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”’  Since Firestone, courts have struggled
to give effect to this delphic statement, and to determine both what constitutes a conflict of
interest and how a conflict should affect the scrutiny of an administrator’s decision to deny
benefits.” (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115) (citations omitted)).
7. Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981
(7th Cir. 1999); see also Fought, 379 F.3d at 1004 (“To say that there is a sliding scale of
deference, however, merely begs the question: how much less deference ought a reviewing court
afford?”); Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392 (“Once the conflict becomes a ‘factor’ however, it is not clear
how the process required by the typical arbitrary and capricious review changes.”).
8. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts announces in its opening section that it is an
attempt to summarize the law of charitable trusts and that it does not attempt to characterize the
law of commercial trusts or the law governing trusts used as a security device.  RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b.  The most crucial substantive problem with applying donative
trust law in ERISA benefit claims stems from the gift, rather than the contract nature of the
traditional trust beneficiary’s interest in the trust and the trust res.  Where a trustee sets aside
assets to be held in trust as a gift (historically, real property going to family members), the
beneficiary has no legal claim against the settlor of the trust to enforce the gift; all of the trust
beneficiary’s rights must be satisfied from the trust res, or perhaps from the trustee if the trustee
has breached its duties.  Since the res is limited, where a trustee must decide how to divide the
(Second) of Trusts to declare that “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that
conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion.’”   Now, sixteen years later, the circuits remain5
significantly divided in how they apply Firestone’s instructions, particularly
when a plan participant asserts that a conflict of interest infected the plan
administrator’s discretionary decision making.   Addressing the difficult chore6
of somehow assigning less deference to the deferential abuse of discretion
standard, the Seventh Circuit wryly remarked, “Judges understand deferential
and non-deferential review, but intermediate variations blur into one another
without promoting understanding or consistent adjudication.”7
Deferential review as applied in ERISA benefit claims stands upon a house
of cards.  First, the stated foundation for deferential review rests upon the
inappropriate application of donative trust law to claims that arise from
contractual obligations between an employer and its employees.8
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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trust res among a number of beneficiaries the trustee must consider the interests of all trust
beneficiaries because a distribution to one necessarily leaves less to distribute to other
beneficiaries.  Under donative trust law, courts defer to the non-conflicted trustee in large part
because the settlor specifically chose the trustee to make such discretionary decisions.  See
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 139 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[W]hen one of
the possible beneficiaries of the trustee’s decisions is the trustee himself, this degree of
deference is inappropriate.”), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  A commercial
trust is different.  In a commercial trust — for example, a trust used to fund an ERISA benefit
plan — the trust is merely a funding device used to secure separate contract rights.  If the plan
trust is unable to satisfy all of the plan beneficiaries’ claims, the plan sponsor usually must
either replenish the trust, if one exists, or pay the benefits directly out of its general treasury.
See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir.
1987); infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text; see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-
Thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West — Implications for Standard of Review and the Right
to a Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 650-54 (2004).  See
generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1988); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA:
Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955
(1995); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625
(1995); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997); Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s
Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Nothing in
[ERISA’s] legislative history suggests that Congress intended that federal district courts would
function as substitute plan administrators, a role they would inevitably assume if they received
and considered evidence not presented to administrators concerning an employee’s entitlement
to benefits.  Such a procedure would frustrate the goal of prompt resolution of claims by the
fiduciary under the ERISA scheme.”); cf. Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of
Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727 (2004) (suggesting
that courts wrongly defer to ERISA plan administrators and fiduciaries as if the underlying
claim denial arose in the context of an administrative hearing similar to a Social Security
Administration disability benefits claim); see also Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d
327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564
n.7 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
In ERISA, the trust (when employed) is not utilized to make a gift; rather it is
used merely as a device to help guarantee payment of promised and earned
benefits.  Second, even if trust law is an appropriate mechanism to weigh
rights and responsibilities in ERISA claims litigation, courts have bungled the
process.  While courts recite that trust law provides the context for deferential
review in ERISA cases, they actually defer to the ERISA claims administrator
as if it were a neutral administrative law judge that had conducted an
underlying evidentiary hearing worthy of deference.   Deferential review in9
administrative law, founded on different criteria and applied in a different
manner, is a different animal than deference granted to trustees administering
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/4
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10. See DeBofsky, supra note 9.  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (noting different types and levels of
judicial deference).  Unlike ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) cases, in a modern common law breach of
trust action the parties typically conduct discovery and present live witness testimony, subject
to cross-examination, usually in a non-jury trial.  See, e.g., Barnett v. Ross, 3 A.2d 923 (Pa.
1939); see also Donald T. Bogan, Reply, The Unsupported Delegation of Conflict Adjudication
in ERISA Benefit Claims Under the Guise of Judicial Deference, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 25-28
(2004).
11. ERISA provides an express remedy for plan participants or beneficiaries to recover
benefits due under a plan.  See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
12. See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest? 114 YALE L. J. 929, 931 (2005).
13. 154 N.E. 303 (N.Y. 1926).
14. Id. at 304 (quoting Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R., 8 N.E. 355, 358
(N.Y. 1886) (citations omitted)); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)
(“Many forms of conduct permissible in the workaday world for those acting at arm’s length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior.  As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate.  Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular
exceptions.  Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than
a donative trust.   Further, and most importantly for purposes of this article,10
when reviewing a conflicted ERISA plan administrator’s discretionary
decision to deny a benefits claim,  courts have largely ignored trust law’s11
most basic consumer protection against the cupidity of a self-dealing fiduciary
by failing to apply the “no-further-inquiry rule.”12
Perhaps the best recitation of the no-further-inquiry rule is Judge (later
Justice) Cardozo’s colloquy in Wendt v. Fischer.   The fiduciary in Wendt13
claimed that his sale of trust property to his own corporation was on fair terms,
despite the inherent conflict of interest.  Judge Cardozo replied:
[W]e are told that the [fiduciary] acted in good faith, that the terms
procured were the best obtainable at the moment, and that the
wrong, if any, was unaccompanied by damage.  This is no
sufficient answer by a trustee forgetful of his duty.  The law “does
not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or
unfair.  It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets
aside the transaction or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the
party whom the fiduciary undertook to represent, without
undertaking to deal with the question of abstract justice in the
particular case.”  Only by this uncompromising rigidity has the rule
of undivided loyalty been maintained against disintegrating
erosion.14
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that trodden by the crowd.”) (citation omitted).
15. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 2004); cf.
Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.
1999) (no inherent conflict of interest where large insurer or corporation serves as both payor
of benefit claims and plan administrator).
16. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th
Cir. 1987) (arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a point).  See discussion infra
text accompanying notes 78-82.
17. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565-68 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).  Ninth Circuit claimants must first prove both a
conflict and causation before burden-shifting applies.  See Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Abatie v. Alta Health &
Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 437 F.3d 860 (2006).
18. In Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., the court recited the substance
of the no-further-inquiry rule, but did not apply the irrebuttable presumption of bias required
under the rule.  898 F.2d at 1566-68; see infra text accompanying notes 208-28; see also Bruch
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part & rev’d in part,
489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
19. See Munson, 8 N.E. at 358-59 (citing Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 251, 252 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816)); Piatt v. Longworth’s Devisees, 27 Ohio St. 159, 195-96 (1875); see also UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 802 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 230 (2000) (“[Transactions accomplished by a self-dealing
trustee] are irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary
interests.  It is immaterial whether the trustee acts in good faith or pays a fair consideration.”);
Elizabeth T. MeHaffey, Comment, The Punctilio of an Honor the Most “Cents”-itive: Trustees,
Broker-Dealers, and North Carolina’s Self-Dealing Ban, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1982-84 (2000)
(discussing the differences in how the new Uniform Trust Code and the old Uniform Trust Act
recommend state legislatures codify the no-further-inquiry rule).
All circuit courts agree that an ERISA plan administrator’s conflict of
interest contaminates the plan administrator’s decision making to some
degree.  Recognition of that effect then requires some modification to the15
level of deference courts afford a conflicted plan administrator.  Many courts
account for the conflict by applying a sliding scale, adjusting the level of
deference according to the perceived seriousness of the conflict.16
Additionally, the Eleventh and the Ninth Circuits alter the deferential review
standard by shifting the burden to the plan administrator to prove that its denial
was not influenced by bias.   No court, however, has expressly adopted the17
irrebuttable presumption of taint that is the hallmark of the no-further-inquiry
rule, as a component in its ERISA standard of review.18
Why not?
In Firestone, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to apply a trust law-
based analysis to determine the appropriate standard of review in ERISA
benefit claims.  However, the Court did not limit that analysis only to section
187 comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.  The no-further-inquiry
rule has long been an integral part of the trust law duty of loyalty.   So long19
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20. 379 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005).
21. See id. at 1006.
22. In Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth
Circuit had previously rejected a burden-shifting standard of review in ERISA benefit claims
involving conflicted plan administrators.  Id. at 826-27.
23. See infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
24. See generally DeBofsky, supra note 9.
as courts apply trust law to govern employee benefit claims, this essential trust
law protection for trust beneficiaries should also be applied.
In Fought v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America,  the U.S. Court of20
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-evaluated its method for ascertaining the
appropriate standard of review in conflict of interest-tainted ERISA benefit
claims.  In Fought, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
in imposing a burden-shifting scheme for reviewing claims where a seriously
or inherently conflicted plan administrator has denied benefits to an ERISA
plan participant.   The Tenth Circuit’s switch to burden-shifting, after fifteen21
years of experience with Firestone, evidences continued dissatisfaction with
the deferential review standard in ERISA benefit claims involving conflicted
plan administrators.   Despite the Tenth Circuit’s laudable attempt to clarify22
this tangled area of the law, however, the Fought opinion raises more
questions than it answers.  The Fought court’s failure to fully explore trust law
conflict of interest presumptions, and irrebuttable presumptions, doomed the
Tenth Circuit to failure.  Additionally, by placing evidentiary burdens on plan
participants without addressing the consequential need for discovery and
evidence outside the administrative record, the Tenth Circuit maintained a
summary adjudicative process that tilts heavily against consumers.23
Setting aside any conviction that the Firestone Court erred when it applied
the law of donative trusts to govern ERISA claims arising from plans that are
neither donative in nature, nor, in fact, funded through a trust, and side-
stepping the fact that courts actually apply an administrative law — not a trust
law — standard of review in ERISA claims litigation,  this article24
incorporates an analysis of Fought to suggest that, where courts employ trust
law standards to evaluate ERISA benefit claims, they should also apply the
trust law no-further-inquiry rule.  The no-further-inquiry rule dictates that
courts grant plan participants a de novo review of conflicted plan administrator
claim denials, even where the plan administrator enjoys discretionary
authority.  Application of the no-further-inquiry rule is consistent with the
Firestone Court’s view that trust law governs ERISA claims for benefits due
under section 502(a)(1)(B).  Further, by utilizing the no-further-inquiry rule
in cases where the plan administrator suffers a conflict of interest, courts could
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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25. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 2000).
26. 379 F.3d 997, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972.
27. See Langbein, supra note 12.
28. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1989).
establish a simple, uniform, and familiar review standard that would govern
the vast majority of ERISA benefit claims.
Part II below provides background analysis of the ERISA standard of
review controversy.  This Part illustrates the continuing failure of the circuit
courts to produce a consistent and just claims process in employee benefit
cases where courts defer to self-interested plan administrators.  The analysis
begins with Firestone and its pronouncement that trust law should guide
review of challenged benefit claim denials.  Next, Part II argues that the lower
courts have struggled to tease a clear message from Firestone’s “opaque”
standard of review analysis.   In particular, this Part explores the Tenth Circuit25
Court of Appeals’s attempt in Fought  to cure this wounded process, and we26
describe the unfortunate failure of the Tenth Circuit to discover a trust law-
based antidote to Firestone. 
Finally, Part III of this comment works within the parameters of Firestone
to re-introduce the historic trust law-based solution to the problem of self-
dealing fiduciaries: the no-further-inquiry rule.  Here the article capitalizes on
prolific trust law and ERISA scholar Professor John H. Langbein’s recent
examination of the no-further-inquiry rule.  Professor Langbein’s analysis is27
adapted to support a thesis that he did not reach, by applying his discussion of
the no-further-inquiry rule to ERISA benefit cases.  This Part describes how
the summary adjudicative process, invented by contemporary ERISA courts
under the guise of deferential review, mimics the archaic circumstances
existing in courts of equity that spawned the no-further-inquiry rule.  Finally,
Part IV concludes that ERISA courts should apply the no-further-inquiry rule
to irrebuttably counter the mischief that courts have historically presumed
attach to the actions of self-dealing fiduciaries.  Ultimately, by application of
the no-further-inquiry rule in ERISA benefit claims, courts can, and should,
return federal Article III trial judges to their role as neutral, de novo referees
in plan participant claims for benefits due under ERISA.
II. The State of Deferential Review in ERISA Benefit Claims
A. Firestone Directs Trial Courts to Defer Under Trust Law
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (“Firestone”) sponsored a Termination Pay
Plan for its employees, promising a variable level of severance benefits to
workers who lost their jobs at Firestone due to “a reduction in work force.”28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/4
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29. See id.
30. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 146 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in
part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101.
31. Five hundred former Firestone employees sued over the severance benefits.  See id. at
136.
32. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112-13.
33. See id. at 113.
34. See Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 575
(1992); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 1-67
(3d ed. 2000).
After Firestone sold its Plastics Division to Occidental Petroleum Corporation
(Occidental), workers who lost their Firestone jobs, including both those
Occidental hired and those Occidental did not hire, sought severance benefits
from Firestone.29
Firestone interpreted the “reduction in work force” clause narrowly to deny
the workers’ severance benefit claims.   Under Firestone’s view, workers who30
lost their jobs at Firestone due to the corporate restructuring, but who were
then immediately hired to work in essentially the same jobs for Occidental, did
not qualify for severance benefits.  After Firestone refused to pay the
severance claims, the former Firestone employees sued the tire company under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits allegedly due under the
Termination Pay Plan.31
At first blush, the dispute appeared to present a simple contract action.  Each
party to the contract had its own construction of the severance benefit plan
language.  If the disagreement had not arisen in the context of an employment
relationship, a court — or a jury if either party had so requested — would have
heard evidence at trial, resolved factual disputes, and decided, de novo, which
side was right. However, because the former Firestone workers sought to
enforce their rights under an employee benefit plan, different rules applied.
While the parties disagreed on how to interpret the plan contract, the
controversy ultimately boiled down to who had the authority to do the
interpreting, Firestone or the court.  Rather than rely on the merits of its contract
argument, Firestone asserted that ERISA gave Firestone the sole discretion to
construe the plan document and to determine whether it had to pay the
severance benefits.   Firestone argued that the court must defer to an ERISA32
plan administrator’s claims decision unless the plan administrator abused its
discretion.33
Workers have struggled to enforce their rights to promised employee
benefits since the industrial revolution brought American workers off the farm
and into the factory.  In the early years of employee fringe benefit programs,34
courts viewed such benefits as a promise to make a gift, which the employer
could alter or terminate in its discretion, and which the worker could not
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35. See, e.g., Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (Ill. 1928) (upholding employer’s
cancellation of a pension plan because workers had no vested right to the employer’s money);
see also Conison, supra note 34, at 590-93 (citing Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th
Cir. 1944); Cowles, 161 N.E. at 152; Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935)
(syllabus opinion); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898), aff’d mem.,
60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901)).
36. 828 F.2d 134, aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101.
37. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections at 29 U.S.C.).  As the labor movement gained
some government support with the depression era New Deal legislation, workers earned the
right to organize and to bargain collectively with employers to secure better pay, better working
conditions, and fringe benefits.  See generally Bogan, supra note 8, at 662-68; Conison, supra
note 34.
38. LMRA § 302 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000).
39. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 140-44; see also Bogan, supra note 8, at 662-68.
40. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144-45.
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).
42. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144-45.
enforce in court.   In Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,  Third Circuit35 36
Judge Edward R. Becker traced the origins of deferential review in employee
benefit claims litigation.  Judge Becker found that court recognition of a
worker’s right to enforce benefit promises tended to coincide with the
development of national labor law in the early to mid-Twentieth Century,
including the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act).   When ERISA benefit claims began to appear37
in the federal courts after 1974, Judge Becker observed that most federal
courts imported the abuse of discretion standard of review from individual
worker claims brought under LMRA section 302,  which had first borrowed38
the deferential review standard from the common law of trusts.39
In Bruch, Judge Becker recognized that the Firestone workers’ claims for
benefits due under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) were unlike individual worker
claims for breach of trust under LMRA section 302, primarily because of the
conflict of interest question.   In LMRA cases, trustees who review worker40
claims under Taft-Hartley trusts are presumed to be neutral because labor
enjoys equal power with management in selecting such trustees.   In Bruch,41
however, Judge Becker recognized that Firestone, as default plan administrator
of the unfunded benefit plan, suffered a self-dealing conflict of interest.
Firestone simultaneously served as plan sponsor and payor of approved
severance benefits, as well as the plan administrator responsible for
determining eligibility for benefits.   Because Firestone did not fund its42
severance plan through the purchase of insurance or a segregated trust,
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43. See id.
44. Id. at 144.
45. See id. (“[T]he principle articulated in § 187 [of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts]
does not govern judicial review of a [self-dealing] trustee’s decisions.”).
46. See id. at 147-48 (citing various sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS (1981)).
47. See id. at 145 (“[C]ommon sense and principles of trust law require rejection of [the]
presumption [that a trustee serving in dual roles as plan administrator and payor of plan benefits
should be considered impartial].”).
48. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA abounds
with the language and terminology of trust law.”).
49. See id. at 115.
50. See id. at 111-13.
benefits, approved by Firestone as plan administrator, were paid out of its own
operating capital as plan sponsor.   Judge Becker remarked that:43
[the Firestone severance] plan is controlled entirely by the
employer, not by a group evenly divided between employer and
employees. Because the plan is unfunded, every dollar provided in
benefits is a dollar spent by defendant Firestone, the employer; and
every dollar saved by the administrator on behalf of his employer
is a dollar in Firestone’s pocket.44
Judge Becker ruled that, given such direct financial conflict of interest,
deference to the conflicted plan administrator would not be appropriate.45
Judge Becker’s opinion relied mostly upon trust law to impose a de novo
review standard. He also provided directions for the district court to apply
specific rules of contract interpretation when it reconsidered the matter de
novo on remand.   Although Judge Becker did not articulate any specific trust46
law rule or maxim to support the Bruch holding, a careful reading of the Bruch
opinion suggests an unstated application of the irrebuttable presumption of
bias that is the predominant feature of the no-further-inquiry rule.47
In the Supreme Court, trust law clearly carried the day.   However, the48
Firestone Court also failed to mention the no-further-inquiry rule when it
made its passing reference to conflicted plan administrators.   The Firestone49
Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s application of de novo review, but not for
the reasons advanced by Judge Becker in the Bruch opinion.  The Firestone
Court applied de novo review under trust law simply because the Firestone
severance plan documents did not contain any language granting discretionary
powers to the plan administrator.  While applying the de novo review50
standard under trust law, however, the Court famously instructed plan sponsors
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
648 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:637
51. See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 217
(predicting that most plan sponsors would immediately add discretionary clauses to their ERISA
plans); see also Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).
52. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (final alteration in original).
53. See, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005).  In Bruch, Judge Becker had rejected the
notion that section 187, comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts controlled the conflict
of interest question.  See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144.  Judge Becker instead cited the “improper
motive” comment to section 187 to suggest that courts should not defer to a self-dealing
fiduciary.  See id. at 141 (“The Court will control the trustee in the exercise of a power where
he acts from an improper even though not a dishonest motive. . . . In the determination of the
question whether the trustee in the exercise of power is acting from an improper motive the fact
that the trustee has an interest conflicting with that of the beneficiary is to be considered.”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. g (1959)); see also Brown v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1040 (1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. g).
how to obtain deferential review.   Quoting comment d of section 187 of the51
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the Supreme Court stated:
Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a
denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA § 502 (a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C.] § 1132 (a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan. . . . [F]or purposes of actions under
[ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.] § 1132 (a)(1)(B), the de novo
standard of review applies regardless of whether the plan at issue
is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator
or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of
interest.  Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a “facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion.”52
Unfortunately, the Firestone Court’s “factor” reference left most lower courts
with the impression that section 187, comment d of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts wholly resolved the conflict of interest question in cases where plan
administrators enjoy specific grants of discretionary powers.53
By declaring de novo review the controlling standard where the plan
administrator does not enjoy express discretionary powers, Firestone avoided
an in-depth analysis of the conflict of interest question that deeply concerned
Judge Becker at the circuit court level.  With its offhand dicta, and its
shorthand analysis of how trust law may weigh conflicts of interest, the Court
laid the foundation for lower courts to defer to conflicted plan administrator
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/4
2005] ERISA: NO FURTHER INQUIRY 649
54. See, e.g., Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996); see cases cited supra note
4.
55. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113-14 (“ERISA was enacted ‘to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans . . . .’  Adopting Firestone’s reading
of ERISA would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.”) (internal
quotation omitted); see also ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (congressional findings and
declaration of policy); 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 4747-76.
56. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1004 (“Our failure to articulate clearly the requirements of a
less deferential arbitrary and capricious standard has left district courts in this circuit without
direction and has encouraged litigation.”).
57. See infra note 71 and cases cited therein.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (rev. 2d ed., repl. vol. 1993) (“A
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of a trust to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary.  The trustee must exclude all self-interest, as well as the interest of a third
party, in his administration of the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiary.  The trustee must
not place himself in a position where his own interests or that of another enters into conflict, or
may possibly conflict, with the interest of the trust or its beneficiary.  Put another way, the
trustee may not enter into a transaction or take or continue in a position in which his personal
interest or the interest of a third party is or becomes adverse to the interest of the beneficiary.”);
see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) (“Speaking of the traditional trustee,
Professor Scott’s treatise admonishes that the trustee is not permitted to place himself in a
position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.”) (internal
claim denials, even when such courts believed that the conflicted plan
administrator had wrongfully denied a benefits claim.   By framing the issue54
as a breach of trust, instead of a breach of contract, and by then failing to
plumb the full depth of trust law, the Firestone Court ironically ushered in an
era where plan participants are worse off under ERISA than they were before
Congress enacted this trumpeted consumer protection statute.55
B. The Divided Circuits Since Firestone
One of the advantages gained by the application of the trust law no-further-
inquiry rule in plan administrator conflict of interest cases is a simple, uniform,
and familiar standard of review that would relieve courts from the near-
impossible undertaking of trying to consistently apply an unarticulated, less
deferential, yet still somewhat deferential standard of review.   The need for56
such a straightforward, uniform rule is reflected in the divergent approaches
the circuit courts currently employ to weigh claims arising from plans
incorporating a variety of funding mechanisms that often foster conflicts of
interest.57
Trust law generally prohibits a trustee from entering transactions that create
a conflict of interest.   In ERISA, however, conflicts of interest abound58
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quotation omitted).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1) (stating that any person may serve in more than one
fiduciary capacity, including service both as trustee and administrator); Chalmers v. Quaker
Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (“ERISA contemplates less neutrality than is
required in a judicial forum.” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3))); see also Fought, 379 F.3d at
1005 (“ERISA envisions that a fiduciary may ‘wear two hats,’ one of a trustee or fiduciary and
one of a settlor.” (quoting Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit
Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1161 (2001))).
60. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005-07 (although an insurer serving in dual roles is inherently
conflicted, plan participant must still prove the seriousness of other types of dual role
relationships in order to invoke burden-shifting); Pinto v. Reliance Life Standard Life Ins. Co.,
214 F.3d 377, 387-90 (3d Cir. 2000) (identifying several of the common methods employers
choose to fund plans, discussing how conflicts of interest arise in such funding systems,
examining the views of the various circuits, and adopting the view that an inherent conflict of
interest arises when an insurance company serves the dual roles of payor of benefits and claims
administrator under a fully insured plan).
61. See, e.g., Leipzig v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 362 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[M]ost
insurers are well diversified, so that the decision in any one case has no perceptible effect on
the bottom line.”). 
62. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 383-90; see also Stup v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 390 F.3d
301, 307 (4th Cir. 2004); Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1021-22 (10th
Cir. 2004); Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 385 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004); Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir.
2003), overruled on other grounds, Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822
(2003); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
XXxIn the Fifth Circuit, compare Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 295-98 (5th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (insurer’s interest in maintaining a good reputation for fair claims
processing is outweighed by its incentive to self-deal where the insurer serves as both payor of
plan benefits and plan administrator), with Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 394 F.3d 262,
270 n.18 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike the dissent, we will not read into Vega a presumption that a
conflict exists ipso facto merely because the plan fiduciary both insures the plan and administers
it.”).  In the Eighth Circuit, compare Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 947-48
(8th Cir. 2000), and Phillips-Foster v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 302 F.3d 785, 795 (8th Cir.
because ERISA expressly authorizes the plan sponsor to serve in multiple
capacities, including concurrently acting as both plan sponsor and plan
administrator.   Depending on the mechanics of plan funding and the59
relationships between the plan sponsor and the plan administrator, or trustee,
some courts have found that certain funding circumstances create an inherent
conflict of interest that justifies a modification to the deferential standard of
review.   Other courts evaluating the same funding mechanism and60
relationships do not find an inherent conflict of interest.61
For example, many courts hold that when an insurance company serves as
both plan administrator and as plan insurer, an inherent conflict of interest
exists.   Some circuits hold that an insurer’s dual role does not, in and of62
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2002), with McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
Davolt v. Executive Comm. of O’Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2000)).
XXxThe Ninth Circuit appears to recognize a dual role insurer’s inherent conflict, but it does
not alter the deferential review standard unless the claimant also establishes that the conflict
impacted the claims decision. See Jordan v. Northrup Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan,
370 F.3d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d
1053 (9th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 437 F.3d 860 (2006); cf. Tremain v. Bell Indus.,
Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999).  Similarly, the Second Circuit requires evidence that
a conflict actually infected the claims decision before it applies anything but the most
deferential standard. See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477 (2d
Cir. 1997).  But see DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 66 & n.3 (2d Cir.
1997).
63. See, e.g., Wagner v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 03-7957, 2004 WL 1303637, at *1
(2d Cir. June 14, 2004), aff’g No. 02 Civ. 9135(RLC), 2003 WL 21960997 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 958 (2004); Leipzig, 362 F.3d at 409; Mers v. Marriott Int’l Group
Accident Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Wright
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2005); Perlman
v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 1999);
cf. Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2002).
64. See, e.g., Williams v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir.
2004); Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2002); Skretvedt v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2001); Yochum v. Barnett Banks, Inc.
Severance Pay Plan, 234 F.3d 541, 544 (11th Cir. 2000); Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 846 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2000); Friedrich v. Intel, 181 F.3d 1105, 1109-10
(9th Cir. 1999).
65. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Colucci v. Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2005); Perlman, 195
F.3d at 981; Hickey v. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 1995).
66. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 947, 949 (6th Cir.
2005); Jordan, 370 F.3d at 875-76; Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st
Cir. 1998); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1998); Pagan v. NYNEX
Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 440-44 (2d Cir. 1995).  But see Pinto, 214 F.3d at 389 (“[T]his is
not a scenario where a ‘smoking gun’ is likely to surface, and direct evidence of a conflict
[affecting the plan administrator] is rarely likely to appear in any plan administrator’s
itself, create a conflict of interest.   Similarly, where the employer/plan63
sponsor serves as plan administrator of an unfunded plan, or if it appoints a
group of its officers or employees to serve as plan administrator, courts often
find an inherent or structural conflict of interest.   However, even some courts64
that recognize an inherent conflict in the insurance company dual role
circumstance do not recognize an inherent conflict of interest when an
employer serves the dual roles of direct payor of plan benefits and plan
administrator.   Additionally, where courts recognize an inherent conflict of65
interest or where the plan participant has proven a conflict of interest, several
courts require further evidence that such conflict in fact impacted the plan
administrator’s decision making.66
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decision.”).
67. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825-26 (10th Cir. 1996).
Under the arbitrary and capricious review standard, courts do not evaluate whether the plan
administrator correctly decided to deny a claim according to the facts, the language of the plan,
and the dictates of ERISA.  Rather, federal courts will uphold a plan administrator’s claim
denial, even if wrong, so long as the decision did not result from an abuse of discretion.  See
cases cited supra note 4, which define abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious actions as
unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence, made in bad faith, or erroneous on a
question of law.
68. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir.
1987) (discussing cases prior to Firestone and noting that “[F]lexibility in the scope of judicial
review need not require a proliferation of different standards of review; the arbitrary and
capricious standard may be a range, not a point.  There may be in effect a sliding scale of
judicial review of trustees’ decisions . . . more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of
partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is.”) (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2003);
Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2002); Pinto, 214 F.3d
at 391-93; Woo, 144 F.3d at 1162; McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1258-
59 (10th Cir. 1998); Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825-26.
70. See, e.g., McLeod v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir.
2004); Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344.
71. The First Circuit does not recognize an inherent conflict of interest resulting from an
insurer serving in the dual roles of plan insurer and claims administrator, see Glista v UNUM
Life Ins. Co of Am., 378 F.3d 113, 125-26 (1st Cir. 2004), or from the employer serving the
dual roles of plan sponsor and plan administrator, see Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184.  If, however, a
plan participant proves that a claim decision-maker was operating under a conflict of interest,
courts will “‘adher[e] to the arbitrary and capricious principle, with special emphasis on
reasonableness, but with the burden on the claimant to show that the [insurer’s] decision was
improperly motivated.’”  Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 415,
418 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (alterations in original)).
XXxThe Second Circuit adheres to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review unless the
Following Firestone’s express instructions, each of the circuits considers a
plan administrator’s conflict of interest as a factor in applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review when the plan sponsor has granted discretionary
powers to the plan administrator.  Applying the conflict of interest as a factor67
usually produces a “sliding scale” approach to the deferential standard of
review. When courts apply a sliding scale approach, they modify the
deferential standard by lowering the degree of deference bestowed upon the
plan administrator in some manner.   Some courts simply recite that the68
sliding scale approach reduces the level of deference in proportion to the
seriousness of the conflict,  while other opinions list factors that courts should69
consider when they contemplate modifying the level of deference in response
to a conflict of interest.   The circuits vary, sometimes significantly, in the70
considerations or listed factors employed to analyze what standard of review
they will apply.71
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participant can show that a conflict affected the plan administrator’s decision.  See Pulvers v.
First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).  If the plan participant can show that
the conflict affected the plan’s decision, the Second Circuit applies de novo review.  See
Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
Pagan, 52 F.3d at 441-44 (where plan sponsor established unfunded plan administered by
employer-appointed committee, inherent conflict of interest considered as a factor in applying
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, but rejecting burden-shifting approach, and
requiring plan participant to present evidence that conflict of interest caused the plan
administrator to deny claim, whereupon court would review the claim denial de novo).  But cf.
DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that
standard set forth in Whitney is the law in the Second Circuit, but criticizing that standard on
ground that, under Firestone, the fact of a conflict of interest should be taken into account even
if there is no evidence that the conflict affected the decision). 
XXxThe Third Circuit suggests that an employer who administers an unfunded plan may have
a competing incentive not to unfairly deny claims because the employer profits from
administering claims fairly by maintaining high worker morale.  See Smathers v. Multi-Tool,
Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Third Circuit has also noted that an insurer does
not have similar competing motivations of maintaining employee good will as does the plan
sponsor/employer.  See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388-89.  Consequently, the heightened, sliding scale
review standard is less probing in the Third Circuit when an employer administers an unfunded
plan than in the circumstance where an insurer serves the dual roles of claims administrator and
payor of claims, though a moderate level of heightened review will still apply in cases where
the employer administers an unfunded plan.  See Smathers, 298 F.3d at 197 (applying
“somewhat heightened” deferential standard where employer administered partially unfunded
plan).
XXxThe Fourth Circuit holds that “[w]hen a plan administrator or fiduciary with a conflict of
interest is vested with discretion, the deference normally given under the abuse of discretion
standard is reduced ‘to the degree necessary to neutralize any untoward influence resulting from
the conflict.’”  Gallagher, 305 F.3d at 268 n.3 (quoting Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d
228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997)).  The Fourth Circuit applies the conflict of interest factor on a case by
case basis, incorporating a sliding scale.  See Humrickhouse ex rel. Bedrick v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 93 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Colucci v. Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431
F.3d 170, 178-80 (4th Cir. 2005) (no inherent conflict merely because plan administrator also
funds plan promises).
XXxThe Fifth Circuit employs a sliding scale standard when an insurer serves the dual roles of
claims fiduciary and payor of benefits, holding that such inherent conflict of interest requires
some modification of the arbitrary and capricious review standard.  See Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins.
Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 295-97 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming the sliding scale approach
announced in Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir. 1992), after
examination of approaches to conflict issues utilized in other circuits).
XXxThe Sixth Circuit holds that, although a conflict of interest is a factor to be considered in
reviewing a plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits, the existence of the conflict alone
does not provide grounds for overturning the administrator’s decision, absent an evidentiary
demonstration that the conflict actually affected the decision.  See Whitaker, 404 F.3d at 949;
Peruzzi v. Summa Med. Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 1998).
XXxIn the Seventh Circuit, where a plan insurer also administers claims, no conflict of interest
that would alter the review standard is presumed.  See Liepzig v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 362 F.3d
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406, 408-09 (7th Cir. 2004).  Applying its law and economics rationale, the Seventh Circuit
appears to aggressively resist any modification to the arbitrary and capricious standard when
a plan participant urges the court to consider such potential conflict as a factor in its review
process.  See, e.g., Mers v. Marriott Int’l Group Accident Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144
F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A decision to award Mers benefits would cost AIG [the plan
insurer and claims administrator] $200,000.  AIG has consistently been named as one of the
fifty largest companies in the ‘Fortune 500’ listing.  The impact of granting or denying benefits
in this case is minuscule compared to AIG’s bottom line.”); Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp.
Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 1999) (“When the
administrator is a large corporation, the firm has a financial interest, but the award in any one
case will have only a trivial effect on its operating results.  Corporations act through agents, and
these agents usually lack any stake in the outcome. . . . Large businesses such as Swiss Bank
want to maintain a reputation for fair dealing with their employees.  They offer fringe benefits
such as disability plans to attract good workers, which they will be unable to do if promised
benefits are not paid.  We have no reason to think that UNUM’s benefits staff is any more
‘partial’ against applicants than are federal judges when deciding income-tax cases.  A further
problem impedes treating UNUM’s self-interest as a strike against its decision: it may not have
any stake in the decision.  Although it insures the payment of the long-term benefits, the record
does not reveal the terms on which the insurance was written.  For many large firms, health and
disability insurance on their labor forces is retrospectively rated.  This means that the employer
agrees to reimburse the insurer for all outlays, plus a loading charge and administration fee.”).
XXxIn Woo, 144 F.3d at 1162, the Eighth Circuit first established a two-part “gateway” test that
must be met for the court to modify the ordinary abuse of discretion standard of review.  The
claimant must present material, probative evidence demonstrating that (1) a “palpable” conflict
of interest existed, or that a “serious procedural irregularity” occurred, and (2) the conflict
actually caused a serious breach of the administrator’s fiduciary duty to the claimant.  See
Torres v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 405 F.3d 670, 678 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that “UNUM
admits it serves as both insurer and administrator of long-term disability plan at issue.  We have
held this to be palpable evidence of a conflict of interest.”  (citing Farfalla v. Mut. of Omaha
Ins. Co., 324 F.3d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 2002))).  Compare Davolt v. Executive Comm. of O’Reilly
Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[Conflict of interest question] is fact specific and
limited to instances where the relationship places the ERISA benefits plan administrator in a
‘perpetual’ conflict of interest.” (citing Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265-
68 (8th Cir. 1997))), with Phillips-Foster v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 302 F.3d 785, 795 (8th
Cir. 2002) (stating “[s]omething like a rebuttable presumption of conflict of interest exists when
the insurer is also the plan administrator” (citing Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d
944, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2000)).  The Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that a claimant who can
meet the “considerable hurdle” presented by the second prong of the test will more than likely
have substantial evidence that the decision was arbitrary and capricious once a sliding scale
analysis is adopted.  See, e.g., Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a
significantly less deferential standard of review required where evidence shows that Aetna
attempted to minimize claims payments by providing incentives and bonuses to its claim
reviewers that produced “claims savings”).
XXxSee infra notes 17 & 62 (regarding the Ninth Circuit approach to the standard of review
question when the plan administrator suffers a conflict of interest).
XXxSee infra text accompanying notes 78-164 (regarding the Tenth Circuit approach to the
standard of review question when the plan administrator suffers a serious or an inherent conflict
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of interest).
XXxSee infra text accompanying notes 209-28 (regarding the Eleventh Circuit approach to the
standard of review question when the plan administrator suffers a conflict of interest).
72. See, e.g., Kevin Walker Beatty, Comment, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of
Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733
(2000); Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1992); George Lee
Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 133
(1989); Kennedy, supra note 59; Nola A. Kohler, Note, An Overview of the Inconsistency
Among the Circuits Concerning the Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA Action
with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit’s Adoption of the Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v.
Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L. REV. (1999); Langbein, supra note 51; Muir, supra note 8.  For
pre-Firestone commentary, see Bradley R. Duncan, Note, ERISA: Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL
L. REV. 986 (1986); John A. McCreary, Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary & Capricious Standard
Under ERISA: Its Origins and Applications, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033 (1985).
73. Most courts review ERISA claim denials based upon the “administrative record”
collected by the plan administrator when review is deferential.  See, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1003 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1972
(2005).  See discussion infra text accompanying notes 189-207.
74. See, e.g., Wardle v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding that ERISA plaintiff had no right to jury trial).  But see Nadworny v. Shaw’s
Supermkts., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 124, 139-40 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing Bogan, supra note 8, at
639-40 (suggesting that claims for benefits due under a plan seek legal relief and therefore,
entitle plan participant the right to a jury trial)).
75. See, e.g., Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1455, 1460 & n.1 (10th Cir.
1991).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 189-207.
The many different approaches utilized to determine whether a plan
administrator suffers a conflict of interest, and if so, how such conflict should
be incorporated to modify the deferential review standard, have caused a
significant lack of confidence in the process on the part of legal scholars.72
The fact that different judges, sometimes within the same circuit, still disagree
about what Firestone requires, reinforces the drastic need to clarify and
simplify this chaos.  Sound public policy is not well served by requiring judges
to uphold admittedly wrong benefit claim denials, particularly where the
process denies plan participants a meaningful day in court. What must plan
participants think when they go to court to challenge a denial, only to learn
that they do not have the right to testify on their own behalf,  to a jury trial,73 74
that their lawyer cannot confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,  and75
that the judge will defer to their adversaries’ opinions over their own?76
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recognized both the confused state of ERISA standard of review jurisprudence,
and the resulting damage to the civil justice system caused by such
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77. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1004 (stating that lack of definite rules to apply in ERISA
benefit claim conflict of interest cases has caused increased amounts of litigation).
78. See, e.g., Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996).
79. See Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Kodak
Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. See, e.g., McLeod v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir.
2004); Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2002); see also
Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392-93 (3d Cir. 2000).
81. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1003-04 (“Since Firestone, all of the circuit courts agree that
a conflict of interest triggers a less deferential standard of review.  The courts, however, differ
over how this lesser degree of deference alters their review process.” (quoting Chambers, 100
F.3d at 825)).  See discussion supra text accompanying notes 56-71.
82. 379 F.3d 997, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972.
83. Id. at 999.  UNUM denied Ms. Fought’s disability claim resulting from a staph
infection that arose from her surgery for a heart condition.  Id. at 1009-10.  Ms. Fought’s
confusion.   The Tenth Circuit’s earnest, but unsuccessful, attempt to remedy77
the deferential standard of review problem again confirms the need to re-
calculate the ERISA benefits claim standard of review process.  Happily,
courts can employ the no-further-inquiry rule without running afoul of
Firestone.  This solution will produce a simplified, uniform, familiar, and
more just ERISA claims approach.  Before we analyze the no-further-inquiry
rule, however, a brief examination of the Tenth Circuit’s experiment in Fought
warrants a visit.
C. In Fought v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, the Tenth Circuit
Attempted to Clarify Its Standard of Review Analysis
Following the Supreme Court’s instructions in Firestone, the Tenth Circuit
modified the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in ERISA benefit
claims where a plan administrator who enjoyed discretionary powers also
suffered a conflict of interest.   In the past, the Tenth Circuit implemented a78
sliding scale in all such cases to reduce the level of deference afforded to the
plan administrator in inverse proportion to the degree of conflict that afflicted
the plan administrator.   The Tenth Circuit shared that general formula with79
several other circuits.   However, circuits vary when addressing the finer80
details of the sliding scale approach.   Displeased with its own prior efforts to81
clarify the modified deferential review standard in ERISA benefit cases, the
Tenth Circuit reconsidered its approach to this troublesome standard of review
problem in Fought v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America.82
In Fought, a disability plan insurer, UNUM Life Insurance Company of
America (UNUM), also served as plan administrator.  UNUM denied Fought’s
long term disability benefits claim based upon its interpretation of an
ambiguous pre-existing condition exclusion in the plan insurance policy.83
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coronary problems admittedly fell within the pre-existing condition exclusion; however, Ms.
Fought and her doctors asserted that the staph infection was a separate and distinct condition
from the heart ailment which did not predate the heart surgery.  Id. at 1001-02.  The Tenth
Circuit agreed with Ms. Fought that UNUM’s interpretation of the pre-existing condition
exclusion, based upon its chain of “non-proximate” causation, was “attenuated to the point of
absurdity.”  Id. at 1009-10.
84. See id. at 1003.
85. Id. at 999.  UNUM admitted that it served as both plan administrator in charge of
deciding benefit claims and as plan insurer responsible to pay claims it had approved as plan
administrator.  Id.  Later in the opinion, the Tenth Circuit defined UNUM’s dual role
relationship as creating an inherent conflict of interest.  Id. at 1006-07.
86. See id. at 1004 & n.3.
87. Id. at 1004.
88. See, e.g., Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999);
Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
90. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.  When a plan administrator suffers an inherent conflict
of interest under the Fought analysis, the factors test is immaterial.  See id. at 1005-06.
The plan granted discretion to UNUM to interpret policy language and to
determine eligibility for benefits.   UNUM confessed its dual role84
circumstance, which the court accepted as establishing a conflict of interest.85
Consequently, the issue before the Tenth Circuit in Fought was how to account
for the conflict in the deferential review analysis.  Recognizing the lack of
direction provided to trial courts applying intermediate levels of deference,86
the Fought court worked to fix the problem.  Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit
adopted a mixture of the “presumptively void” burden-shifting process used
by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits  and the sliding scale abuse of discretion87
formula familiar to the court from its own precedents.88
Unfortunately, the Fought opinion failed to make clear when a trial court
should apply the sliding scale approach and when it should apply the less
deferential, burden-shifting approach in cases involving the various
permutations of dual roles and different funding mechanisms commonly
utilized by ERISA plan sponsors, except for the insurance company dual roles
circumstance.   Further, the Fought court did not address the discovery and89
evidentiary issues that the Tenth Circuit process now presents to trial courts
in the standard of review analysis.  Trial judges must now consider various
factors relevant to the conflict of interest question when deciding whether they
must invoke the new burden-shifting portion of the conflict of interest standard
of review formula.   Additionally, the Fought court did not expressly clarify90
whether plan participants must prove causation in addition to a serious or
inherent conflict of interest in order to obtain a burden-shifting review
standard.  Finally, the Fought solution to the ERISA fiduciary conflict of
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91. See id. at 1005-07.
92. See id. at 999, 1006-07 (after previously reciting that UNUM admitted a dual role
relationship, holding that UNUM conceded an inherent conflict of interest).
93. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005-07.  Incorporating both the standard conflict of interest and
the inherent conflict of interest, and also procedural irregularities into its new standard of review
analysis the Fought court described its holding as follows:
When the plan administrator operates under either (1) an inherent conflict of
interest; (2) a proven conflict of interest; or (3) when a serious procedural
irregularity exists, and the plan administrator has denied coverage, an additional
reduction in deference is appropriate.  Under this less deferential standard, the
plan administrator bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its decision
pursuant to this court’s traditional arbitrary and capricious standard.  In such
instances, the plan administrator must demonstrate that its interpretation of the
terms of the plan is reasonable and that its application of those terms to the
claimant is supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 1006 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 1006; see also Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1021-22
(10th Cir. 2004) (summarizing the new Fought burden-shifting approach as requiring the dual
role plan administrator to demonstrate “the reasonableness of its decision pursuant to the [Tenth
Circuit’s] traditional arbitrary and capricious standard” when the plan administrator suffers an
inherent conflict of interest) (internal quotations omitted).
interest problem still permits trial courts to uphold incorrect employee benefit
claim denials.
1. “Standard” Versus “Serious” Versus “Inherent” Conflicts of Interest
The Fought opinion parses its standard of review analysis into several
categories depending on whether the plan administrator suffers a “standard”
conflict of interest, a proven “serious” conflict of interest, or an “inherent”
conflict of interest.   The language of the opinion, however, creates overlaps91
that make it difficult to draw these attempted distinctions.  In particular, the
opinion does not clearly define when a plan administrator occupying dual roles
presents a “standard” conflict of interest or when an administrator serving dual
roles creates an “inherent” conflict of interest, outside of the insurance
context.92
The Fought court held that when an insurance company serves in the dual
roles of payor of plan benefits and plan administrator with discretion to decide
benefit claims, an “inherent” conflict of interest exists.   To account for that93
inherent conflict, the Fought court shifted the burden to the conflicted plan
administrator/insurer to prove that its discretionary claim denial was both
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.   Except for this94
circumstance of an insurance company serving in dual roles, the court lumped
all other ERISA fiduciary dual role relationships into the category of a
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/4
2005] ERISA: NO FURTHER INQUIRY 659
95. The conflict of interest question becomes more complicated when plan sponsors use
more varied means than the purchase of insurance to fund employee benefit plans. ERISA
benefit plans may be fully insured as in Fought, 379 F.3d at 999, or fully self-funded through
a segregated trust, see, e.g., Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir.
1993); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970
F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992), or totally unfunded, see, e.g., Williams v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2004); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  Benefit
plans can also be partially funded through a segregated trust and partially insured, see Wright
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2005), partially
unfunded and partially self-funded through a trust, see Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 268 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2001), or partially unfunded and partially insured, see Perlman
v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1999).
XXxMany small employers choose to self-fund health care benefit plans up to a stated
attachment point and then purchase excess coverage, known as stop-loss insurance, to protect
the plan against large claims.  See, e.g., Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 196-98 (3d
Cir. 2002) (finding a conflict where self-insured employer/plan administrator purchased stop-
loss insurance but would still pay $22,522.78 out of its own funds if claim was honored).  Most
courts hold that a nominally self-insured plan, which purchases stop-loss insurance, remains
self-insured for purposes of ERISA’s express preemption language.  See, e.g., Bill Gray Enters.,
Inc. Employee Health & Welfare Plan v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2001); Am.
Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997); Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron
Prods., Inc., Employee Health Benefit Plan, 970 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Granatelli,
897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990); United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Ariz. Health
& Welfare Fund Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986).  Because health care benefit
plans that are not insured enjoy freedom from state regulation due to ERISA preemption, many
large employers also choose this hybrid funding mechanism for their health care benefit plans.
See Bill Gray Enters., 248 F.3d at 215.  See generally Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-
Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 89 (2005).  Depending upon who ultimately pays benefit claims — the
employer/plan sponsor or an insurer, how payments are made — out of an employer’s general
treasury, by an employer through a segregated trust, or through insurance, who appoints the plan
administrator, and the plan administrator’s relationship with the payor of claims, courts evaluate
the relationships and funding mechanisms to determine whether the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review should be applied without modification, or modified to some degree to apply
a lesser level of deference, or abandoned in favor of de novo review.  See Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383-84 (3d Cir. 2000).
96. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
97. Id. at 1005 (quoting Kennedy, supra note 59, at 1161).
“standard” conflict of interest.   According to the Tenth Circuit, a standard95
conflict of interest results when an ERISA fiduciary serves in more than one
ERISA capacity.   After explaining that an ERISA entity “‘may wear two96
hats, one of a trustee or fiduciary and one of a settlor,’”  the Fought court97
proclaimed that “in every case in which the plan administrator operates under
a conflict of interest — or a ‘standard’ conflict of interest case — the plaintiff
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98. Id. (quoting Kennedy, supra note 59, at 1173).
99. Id. (quoting Cirulis v. UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
100. Id. (second alteration in original); see Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098
(10th Cir. 1999) (no inherent conflict where plan administrator was employee of plan sponsor,
but not a corporate officer of shareholder).
101. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005 (citing Cirulis v. UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6
(10th Cir. 2003); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also
Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000); Jones v.
Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1006-07.  In Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1021-22
(10th Cir. 2004), a Tenth Circuit panel relied upon this portion of the Fought opinion, with little
discussion, to hold that an inherent conflict of interest existed solely because an insurance
company served in the dual roles of plan insurer and plan administrator.
105. See cases cited supra note 95 (describing identification of different plan funding
mechanisms).
is required [“]to prove the existence of the conflict.”   While that rather98
circular language sounds confusing, the court did attempt to explain its
meaning by stating: “‘[e]vidence of a conflict of interest requires proof that the
plan administrator’s dual role jeopardized his impartiality.’”   The court then99
instructed: “[t]he mere fact that a plan administrator was a [company]
employee is not enough per se to demonstrate a conflict [of interest].”100
Finally, the opinion suggests that before applying the burden shifting
approach, the claimant must prove that the standard conflict of interest was
“serious.”  The court then repeated four factors that lower courts should
examine to evaluate the “seriousness” of a plan administrator’s conflict.101
The Fought court’s attempt to differentiate between a “standard” conflict
of interest and an “inherent” conflict of interest is curious.  The court defined
both such conflicts as arising from a fiduciary serving in dual roles.  To
recount, the Fought court found that when a plan administrator serves in dual
roles, thereby creating a standard conflict of interest,  the plaintiff must also102
prove that the existence of the dual role conflict was serious in order to prompt
burden-shifting.   Later in the same opinion, however, the court held that103
because UNUM was wearing two hats, an inherent conflict of interest existed
that was serious enough, without further proof, to require burden-shifting.104
Regrettably, Fought does not reveal whether an ERISA fiduciary suffers a
standard or an inherent conflict of interest in those cases involving the
numerous different funding mechanisms utilized by plan sponsors, outside of
the insurance context.105
For example, anytime a plan sponsor appoints an affiliated person or entity
as plan administrator, while contemporaneously paying benefits out of its
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106. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
operating capital, such dual role plan administrator suffers a financial conflict
of interest that arguably is equal in its seriousness to the insurance company
dual role scenario. The Fought opinion is not clear whether such a dual role
relationship may be categorized as creating an inherent conflict, or if the
“inherent conflict” category is wholly reserved for dual role insurers.
If the plan sponsor creates a dual role scenario, which does not involve an
insurance company, following Fought, a Tenth Circuit trial court has two
options: (1) it may read Fought as allowing for other inherent conflicts of
interest outside of the insurance company dual role pattern; or (2) it could read
Fought to reserve the inherent conflict category exclusively for the insurance
company situation. If the trial court does not identify an inherent conflict of
interest from whatever dual role circumstance is presented, the next step in the
Fought paradigm is to determine whether the non-insurance dual role
circumstance creates a serious conflict of interest. Here, the Fought court
referenced the four factors that it suggested bear on the question of
seriousness.   Before the Fought opinion identified its four factors, however,106
the court inferred that if a dual role relationship “jeopardized [the plan
administrator’s] impartiality,” there would be some impact on the standard of
review analysis.   Before we move to the Fought factors, we must determine107
what the Tenth Circuit meant when it spoke of jeopardizing the plan
administrator’s impartiality.
2. Proof That a Conflict “Jeopardized” the Plan Administrator’s
Impartiality
Perhaps the most difficult burden that many plan participants face when
they seek to reduce deference is proving that the plan administrator’s self-
interested conflict actually caused the plan administrator to deny a claim.
While many circuits require ERISA claimants to prove both a conflict of
interest and causation in order to obtain some modification of the deferential
review standard, the Tenth Circuit’s subtle avoidance of this most significant
question reflects the difficulty lower courts have had in coaxing a uniform
standard of review principle from Firestone.
It is now clear from the Fought opinion that if a plan participant in the
Tenth Circuit establishes a plan insurer’s inherent conflict of interest, the
burden shifts to the plan administrator to prove that its claim denial was not
arbitrary and capricious.  This burden shifting analysis does not appear to
require any prior showing that the plan administrator’s inherent conflict caused
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108. See id. at 1006.
109. Id. at 1005 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cirulis v.
UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6 (10th Cir. 2003)).
110. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 944-45 (2005) (citing JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW *438; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58, § 543(A) at 274-77); see id. at
931 (“Courts invalidate a conflicted transaction without regard to its merits — ‘not because
there is fraud, but because there may be fraud.’ ‘[E]quity deems it better to . . . strike down all
disloyal acts, rather than attempt to separate the harmless and the harmful by permitting the
trustee to justify his representation of two interests.’”) (alteration in original) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).  See discussion infra notes 166-81 and accompanying text.
111. See Wendt v. Fisher, 154 N.E. 303 (N.Y. 1926) (quoted supra at text accompanying
notes 13-14).
112. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
a biased decision.   However, if the plan participant can only prove a108
standard, and then a serious conflict, the causation query is cryptically
imbedded in the Tenth Circuit’s pronouncement that: “[e]vidence of a conflict
of interest requires proof that the plan administrator’s dual role jeopardized
his impartiality.”   Given the context, and prior Tenth Circuit authority, this109
article suggests that this phraseology is best construed as the Tenth Circuit’s
further instruction to district courts to closely examine ERISA plan funding
mechanisms and fiduciary dual roles to assure that a financial conflict of
interest actually exists, rather than as a charge requiring plan participants to
prove causation resulting from the dual role conflict.
When other circuit courts require proof, beyond the actuality of a financial
conflict, of a plan administrator’s bias, they misunderstand trust law’s
displeasure with fiduciary conflicts of interest. Additionally, these courts
misconstrue the trust law solution to the problem of self-dealing fiduciaries.
Trust law proscribes conflicts of interest because of the significant danger that
improper motivations might affect a conflicted fiduciary’s decision-making,
not because proof of a conflict establishes causation.   Under the common110
law of trusts, if a trustee operates under a self-dealing conflict of interest, the
no-further-inquiry rule applies to relieve the beneficiary of the evidentiary
burden of proving causation.   Additionally, the no-further-inquiry rule holds111
that once a self-interested conflict is demonstrated, courts not only presume
that the conflict infected the trustee’s decision-making, but also hold that the
presumption of taint is irrebuttable.   Though ERISA courts have almost112
uniformly neglected to fully mine the trust law conflict of interest causation
question, the Tenth Circuit’s continued use of the term “jeopardize” in its
standard of review analysis prompts reflection on the causation issue, which
in turn implicates trust law presumptions and the no-further-inquiry rule.
The Fought court explained that when a dual role relationship exists, the
plan participant must prove that serving in such dual roles “jeopardized [the
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113. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Cirulis, 321 F.3d at 1017 n.6).
114. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1213 (1976).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 185-88.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
117. 196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 1097 (quoting Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
119. 169 F.3d 1287.
120. Id. at 1291.
121. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
fiduciary’s] impartiality.”   The term “jeopardize” does not mean to “cause”;113
rather, it means “to expose to danger.”   Therefore, a plan participant meets114
this test if the claimant proves that the plan administrator’s dual role
circumstance creates the danger of self-dealing.  The use of the term jeopardize
suggests that once the plan participant proves that serving in dual roles created
a financial conflict of interest, the danger of a biased decision arises.
Application of the no-further-inquiry rule here, as in common law trust cases,
would then satisfy the causation element via its irrebuttable presumption of
bias.  In fact, it was in recognition of this danger of bias resulting from self-
dealing conflicts that equity courts first developed the no-further-inquiry
rule.  The Tenth Circuit’s use of the term “jeopardize” rather than “cause”115
indicates that the Tenth Circuit does not impose a burden of proving causation
on ERISA plan participants. If that is the correct reading of Fought, it places
the Tenth Circuit in sync with traditional trust law.116
Earlier Tenth Circuit cases utilizing the “jeopardize” term indicate that a
plan participant is required to prove that the administrator’s dual roles merely
caused a financial conflict of interest, rather than also requiring proof that the
conflict was the proximate cause of the denial of benefits.  In Kimber v.
Thiokol Corp.,  the Tenth Circuit stated that “before applying the sliding117
scale, there must first be evidence of a conflict of interest, i.e., proof ‘that the
plan administrator’s dual role jeopardized his impartiality.’”  Similarly, in118
Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan,  the court used the phrase119
“jeopardized his impartiality” in conjunction with the Tenth Circuit factors to
underscore that no inherent conflict of interest is presumed “simply because
the fiduciary works for the company funding the plan.”   This reading of120
Fought is further reinforced by the Fought court’s statement that “‘[t]he
rationale for [reducing the level of deference afforded a self-interested plan
administrator] is clear.  A conflicted fiduciary may favor, consciously or
unconsciously, its interests over the interests of the plan beneficiaries.’”121
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122. Id. at 1005.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 196-207.
124. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Cirulis v. UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6
(10th Cir. 2003)); see also Jones, 169 F.3d at 1291.
125. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
126. The term “self-funded” is not included in ERISA’s reasonably lengthy definitions
section.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
127. See Bogan, supra note 8, at 671-72 (describing inter-relation of ERISA § 403(a), 29
3. The Four Factors
In addition to the ambiguity of whether serving in dual roles creates a
standard or inherent conflict, the Fought court further complicated the analysis
by listing factors intended to clarify what evidence may turn a “standard”
conflict of interest into a “serious” conflict of interest.   Regrettably, except122
for the insurance company dual role circumstance, the court did not lend
context to its factors test by providing detail regarding the various funding
mechanisms typically utilized by plan sponsors. Additionally, the court did not
anticipate the evidentiary dilemma its factors test raises in an ERISA process
that shuns evidence.123
Relevant factors identified by the Tenth Circuit include: (1) whether “‘the
plan is self-funded,’” (2) whether the plan sponsor/employer “‘appointed and
compensated the plan administrator,’” (3) whether the plan administrator’s
performance reviews or level of compensation were linked to “‘his or her
record for denying of benefits,’” and (4) whether “‘the provision of benefits
had a significant economic impact on the company administering the plan.’”124
Unfortunately, Fought does not clarify how the factors should be weighed to
prompt a finding of a “serious” conflict of interest.
a) [Whether] the Plan Is Self-funded125
What does the Fought court mean by “self-funded?”   Is the court126
suggesting here that if a plan is funded through an actuarially grounded trust,
where periodic payments are made to fund the trust regardless of specific
claims, that no conflict, or at least no serious conflict, exists?  Or is the court
saying that where an employer pays benefits out of its operating capital, where
no trust has been established and where the employer has not purchased
insurance to fund plan promises (an unfunded plan), that a serious conflict of
interest exists?  Because the Tenth Circuit has not applied a consistent
definition of the term “self-funded” we do not know whether the Fought court
intended self-funded plans to encompass unfunded plans.
Recall that ERISA requires plan sponsors to fund pension plans through the
establishment of a trust or the purchase of insurance.   If a pension plan127
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U.S.C. § 1103(a); § 403 (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(2); § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1081(a)(1)).
128. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2000);
Buckley v. Metro. Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939-40 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Woolsey v. Marion
Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1459-60 (10th Cir. 1991).
129. Arguably, an indirect conflict of interest remains here because the plan sponsor
ultimately pays the claims, regardless of the funding mechanism, and because the employer may
have to replenish the plan trust if it is under-funded.  See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  Compare
Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1987)
(if ERISA trust is under-funded employer must pay benefits out of its general treasury), with
Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees’ Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1984) (dual
role trustees sought to distribute surplus trust funds to the employer rather than use such funds
to purchase additional or better benefits for plan participants).
130. 934 F.2d 1452.
131. Id. at 1459 (the plan document recited that “the Company shall not have any right, title,
or interest in the contributions made by it under the Plan and no part of the Trust Fund shall
revert to it or for its benefit”); see also Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5
(3d Cir. 1993); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried
Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992).
132. See supra note 127 (discussing Bogan, supra note 8).
133. See, e.g., Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144.
134. 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
sponsor does not purchase insurance to fund plan promises, the plan sponsor
must set aside assets to fund a trust from which such pension benefit claims
will be paid.  When a plan sponsor establishes a trust to fund an ERISA plan,
benefit claims arguably do not present a “serious” conflict of interest for the
dual-role employer because approval of a claim does not result in a direct,
dollar-for-dollar loss to the employer, since payment does not come from the
employer’s operating capital.   Similarly, claim denials arising from plans128
funded through such a trust may not cause an immediate, direct, dollar-for-
dollar gain for the employer because the money saved typically stays in the
trust, rather than being returned to the employer.   The Tenth Circuit129
championed this rationale in Woolsey v. Marion Laboratories, Inc.,  holding130
that a dual role administrator did not suffer an inherent conflict of interest
because the trust was funded through regular contributions unrelated to claims
and was governed by a non-reversion clause.131
Recall also that unlike pension plans, ERISA does not require plan sponsors
to fund welfare benefit plans.   Consequently, without insurance or an132
established trust, sponsors necessarily pay benefits from their own general
treasury.   In Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan,  the Tenth Circuit133 134
described such an unfunded plan, which arguably presented a significantly
different risk of plan administrator self-dealing than the plan in Woolsey, as
“self-funded.”  The Jones court stated:
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135. Id. at 1290 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
136. See also Charter Canyon Treatment Ctr. v. Pool Co., 153 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir.
1998) (describing apparently unfunded health plan as a “self-funded” plan).
137. 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000).
138. Id. at 388.
139. Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1459-60 (10th Cir. 1991).
140. See also Cirulis v. UNUM Corp., 321 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n
Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., we suggested that when the plan administrator and
a third-party insurer are the same entity, this alone may suffice to show a conflict of interest.
Pitman’s holding was expressly limited to exclude situations in which a plan is self-funded, i.e.,
where an employee of the company administers the plan.  Unlike an insurer, an employer (or
its agent-employee) does not usually derive its profit solely from the administration of the
benefits plan.  In this case, the plan administrator is an employee of UNUM, rather than a third-
party insurer.  This suggests that Pitman may not apply.  However, as UNUM, unlike most other
employers, presumably derives profits from administering employee benefit plans for other
companies, it is arguable that the identity of the plan administrator as an UNUM employee may,
standing alone, provide sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest warranting a reduced level
The Plan Administrator has “full discretionary authority in all
matters related to the discharge of his responsibilities . . . including,
without limitation, his construction of the terms of the Plan and his
determination of eligibility for Coverage and Benefits.”  The Plan
Administrator is an Eastman Kodak employee, and the Plan is
entirely self-funded, which means that Eastman Kodak employees
do not contribute toward the premiums.  Rather, payment for
covered medical care comes out of company revenues.135
The differing circumstances that the Tenth Circuit has described as
producing a “self-funded” plan renders the Fought court’s use of that term
ambiguous.  Because Jones includes unfunded plans within its definition of
self-funded plans,  it remains unclear whether the Fought court intended the136
self-funded nature of a plan to indicate that the conflict of interest is serious.
If the Fought court did intend to include unfunded plans within the definition
of a “self-funded” plan, as the Jones opinion suggests, then self-funding
indicates a serious conflict of interest.  However, if the Fought court only
intended “self-funded” to mean plans funded through an actuarially grounded
trust containing a non-reversion clause, as in Woolsey, then the description of
a plan as being self-funded indicates that the dual-role conflict may not be
sufficiently serious to warrant burden-shifting.
If the Fought court had cited Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Co.,  the seminal case discussing this point,  or Woolsey,  it would have137 138 139
clarified how the nature of a self-funded plan should influence a court’s
determination of a serious conflict of interest. The Fought court’s failure to
cite Woolsey or Pinto leaves the court’s intended message unclear.  140
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of deference.”) (citing Pitman, 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2000)); Kimber v. Thiokol
Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that first two factors were present
because a “self-funded” plan was involved and the employer appointed the plan administrator;
however, because the plan administrator was not an officer or corporate shareholder and
because there was negligible evidence concerning the economic impact on the employer, no
conflict of interest existed).
141. See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1005 (10th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005).
142. See, e.g., Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1987),
aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (comparing LMRA, which mandates that
management and labor shall have an equal voice in selecting plan trustees arising from a
collectively bargained employee benefit plan, to ERISA, which contains no such mandate).
143. See Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (plan
sponsor of unfunded plan delegated initial claims administration to outside Third Party
Administrator, though Plan Administrator with final authority to determine claims was
employee of plan sponsor/employer).
144. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
b) [Whether] the Company Funding the Plan Appointed and
Compensated the Plan Administrator141
Although descriptive, this factor does not yield any useful basis on which
to differentiate between a serious or  non-serious conflict of interest.  It appears
that in every non-union, employer-sponsored ERISA plan, the employer
retains the power to appoint the plan administrator.  Typically, employers
exercise this power without input from the covered workers.   Additionally,142
the employer who sponsors a plan always pays the plan administrator, if not
directly through salary and bonuses, then either by paying premiums to an
insurer who serves as plan administrator, or by paying a contracted fee to a
Third Party Administrator.   The question then remains how this factor helps143
trial judges distinguish between dual role circumstances that create a standard
conflict of interest from those that create a serious conflict of interest.  While
this factor always suggests some level of financial conflict, absent more
direction from the court, identifying the circumstance does not determine
whether a serious conflict exists.  Further, the Fought opinion does not
indicate whether this factor must exist in conjunction with other factors in
order to produce a serious conflict.
c) [Whether] the Plan Administrator’s Performance Reviews or Level of
Compensation Were Linked to the Denial of Benefits Claims144
Although this third factor appears clear, it raises the question of evidence
outside the administrative record.  If an employer links the plan administrator’s
positive performance review, or its salary, compensation, or bonuses to its
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145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that significantly less deferential standard of review is required where evidence shows
that Aetna attempted to minimize claims payments by providing incentives and bonuses to its
claim reviewers that produced “claims savings”).
147. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
148. See Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In
reviewing a plan administrator’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, we ‘are
limited to the “administrative record” — the materials compiled by the administrator in the
course of making his decision.’” (quoting Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197,
1201 (10th Cir. 2002))).
denial of claims, clearly a strong financial conflict of interest results.145
Although the Fought opinion does not say so explicitly, evidence of such a
direct financial conflict may be sufficiently “serious” to warrant burden-
shifting, even absent any of the additional factors.146
While proof of this factor likely creates a “serious” conflict, placing the
burden on the plan participant to prove such a link without also allowing
discovery and evidence outside the administrative record presents a near
impossible task.  A plan administrator may deny such a direct link in an
affidavit placed in the administrative record.  However, it is easy to imagine
that such plan administrator would find it difficult to maintain that denial
under cross-examination by a skillful trial lawyer.
For example, one could assume that an administrator employed by a for-
profit corporation would admit that profit is a primary goal for the employer.
This same administrator would also likely admit that the employer highly
values workers who help the employer reach or maintain this goal.  Perhaps
the administrator would also admit that if an employee’s job performance
helped the employer earn more money, such action would be considered a
positive factor in the employee’s performance evaluation, and that positive
performance evaluations lead to advancement within the company.  Absent
discovery and evidence outside the administrative record, including the right
to cross-examine witnesses, a plan participant remains unable to sift witnesses
who may deny this potential job performance/compensation link to claim
denials, thereby limiting the plan participant’s ability to prove this factor in the
serious conflict of interest analysis.
d) [Whether] the Provision of Benefits Had a Significant Economic
Impact on the Company Administering the Plan147
This “significant economic impact” factor raises questions of how to
account for relative values of what may be “significant” to a particular
employer or court.  Also, it operates in tension with the Tenth Circuit’s
moratorium on evidence outside the “administrative record” in such claims.148
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149. 144 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 1020.
151. 298 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2002).
152. See id. at 197; see also Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for
Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1172-73 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing the impact of a
$2,000,000 liability to the plan and plan sponsor).
153. We know that some large employers consider employee benefit claims to be very
significant in their ability to compete in the marketplace.  General Motors Corporation
complains that its employee benefits obligations add $1500.00 to the cost of every new car it
produces.  See Ron Sherer, Rising Benefits Burden, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 9, 2005, at
1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0609/p01s01-usec.htm.  Additionally, several
of the major United States-based airlines have either sought concessions from their unions to
reduce fringe benefits in order to compete in the marketplace, or have filed bankruptcy, in part
at least, to shed the economic burden of their employee benefits plans.  See Pressure Mounts
on Other Airlines to Seek Pension Relief, USA TODAY, May 12, 2005, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/travel/news/2005-05-12-pension-pressure_x.htm; Michael Schroeder, Big Stakes
in Ailing Airlines Raise Questions for U.S. Pension Agency, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at A1.
See generally Johnathan E. Collins, Comment, Airlines Jettison Their Pension Plans: Congress
Must Act to Save the PBGC and Protect Plan Beneficiaries, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 289 (2005).
Without the opportunity to pursue discovery and offer evidence outside the
administrative record, a plan participant in the Tenth Circuit will necessarily
struggle to establish how payment of benefit claims impacts an employer’s
finances.
Circuit courts differ over the amount of money they view as significant in
particular cases.  For example, in Mers v. Marriott International Group
Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan,  the Seventh Circuit found no149
conflict of interest where a major insurer denied a $200,000 claim, because
“[t]he impact of granting or denying benefits [was] minuscule compared to
[the insurer’s] bottom line.”   However, in Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc.,  the150 151
Third Circuit decided that a conflict of interest existed where a dual role
administrator of a nominally self-insured plan protected by the purchase of
stop-loss insurance, would pay $22,522.78 out of its own treasury if the claim
was honored.152
Additionally, plan participants would have to pursue substantial amounts
of discovery to produce evidence that a specific claim would likely have a
significant economic impact on an employer serving in dual roles.   Further,153
certain claims that may not be significant standing alone may have a
significant impact on the dual role administrator if the claim is one that could
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154. For example, approximately 500 employees sued Firestone for severance benefits.  See
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989).  While any individual claim
may not have had a significant economic impact on Firestone, 500 claims may have reached a
threshold that Firestone, or more importantly, a court would consider significant.
155. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing
Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985)), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 489
U.S. 101.
156. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1996);
Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Semien
v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 436 F.3d 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2006); cf. Liston v. UNUM Corp. Officer
Severance Plan, 330 F.3d 19, 23-24, 26 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The ordinary rule is that review for
arbitrariness is on the record made before the entity being reviewed.  True, we have declined
in cases like this one to adopt an ironclad rule against new evidence.  For example, discovery
may be needed because the decisional process is too informal to provide a record. And certain
kinds of claims — e.g., proof of corruption — may in their nature or timing take a reviewing
court to materials outside the administrative record.  Still, at least some very good reason is
needed to overcome the strong presumption that the record on review is limited to the record
before the administrator.  This is the view of virtually all of the circuits with the possible
exception of the Fifth Circuit.  It is almost inherent in the idea of reviewing agency or other
administrative action for reasonableness; how could an administrator act unreasonably by
ignoring information never presented to it? . . . Where as here review is under the arbitrariness
standard, the ordinary question is whether the administrator’s action on the record before him
was unreasonable. . . . Mandating discovery in such a situation would be at odds with the
concerns about efficient administration that underlie the ERISA statute itself.  True, Liston is
handicapped by having to show that the outcome of discovery would be helpful before she can
get access to materials that might show just this; but this is the standard situation in discovery
and the reason why those in charge are expected to exercise judgment.”) (citations omitted).
157. See Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 2004);
Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1003 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005); see also Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 293 n.2
(6th Cir. 2005) (“The Court would have a better feel for the weight to accord this conflict if [the
set a precedent for many future large dollar claims or for cumulative claims
addressing the same issue,  or if the claim arises in a class action.154 155
Each of the factors discussed above requires the claimant to pursue
discovery and to introduce evidence outside the administrative record in order
to establish the existence of the identified factor(s).  Outside of the insurance
company dual role context, there is no other way for the plan participant to
establish a right to the burden-shifting standard of review.
One primary justification for summary adjudicative proceedings in ERISA
benefit claims is that Congress intended claimants to benefit from a simple
administrative process that could provide a quick and inexpensive way to
resolve claims.   With the factors complicating the determination of what156
level of review to apply, courts will now have to allow discovery and conduct
evidentiary hearings on the collateral issue of a plan administrator’s conflict
of interest.  Arguably, these additional steps nullify the supposed benefit of157
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claimant] had explored the issue through discovery. . . . [A]n exception to [the general rule that
discovery is prohibited in ERISA benefit claims premised on review of the administrative
record] exists where a plaintiff seeks to pursue a decision-maker’s bias.” (citing Wilkins v.
Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. 150 F.3d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The only exception to the . . .
principle of not receiving new evidence at the district court level [in an ERISA case] arises
when consideration of that evidence is necessary to resolve an ERISA claimant’s procedural
challenge to the administrator’s decision, such as an alleged lack of due process afforded by the
administrator or alleged bias on his part.”) (alterations in original) (emphasis added by Calvert
court))); Orndorf v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 520 (1st Cir. 2005) (“There may
be times when it is appropriate for courts to hear new evidence. . . . For example, evidence
outside the administrative record might be relevant to a claim of personal bias by a plan
administrator or of prejudicial procedural irregularity in the ERISA administrative review
procedure.”).
158. Further, the rules of civil procedure provide the opportunity for emergent relief in those
cases where time is of the essence in determining whether a particular medical procedure, for
example, is or is not covered under a health care benefits plan.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)
(Preliminary Injunction); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) (Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing;
Duration).
159. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144 n.10 (“It has been argued that deferring to the
administrator’s decision will make proceedings faster.  We acknowledge that.  But because
speed is attained by sacrificing the impartiality of the decisionmaker, we think that it comes at
too great a cost.”).
160. Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
161. But cf. Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999) (court rules that
conflict of interest not established, though first two factors present, where plan
administrator/employee was not a corporate officer or shareholder and where court assumed no
significant economic impact).
162. See Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999) (listing
identified factors “by way of example only”).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2000).
164. See Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339-42 (2003) (abandoning
three factor McCarran-Ferguson Act test to determine which state laws regulate insurance);
a simple, quick, and cheap claims process.   Regardless, plan participants158
would most likely prefer a fair, de novo claims hearing before a neutral fact-
finder to a quicker process that is stacked against them.159
The Fought court stated that “[i]f the plaintiff cannot establish a serious
conflict of interest,” according to the four factors test, the standard conflict of
interest rules apply.   The Fought court did not indicate how many of the160
factors must be established to prompt burden-shifting,  or whether one of the161
identified factors should be weighted more heavily than another factor.  A162
similar problem in identifying factors that suggest whether a state law
“regulates insurance” under ERISA’s savings clause exception to
preemption  led to significant lower court confusion. Ultimately, the163
Supreme Court rendered two separate decisions to resolve that factors
problem.164
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UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373-74 (1999) (rejecting argument that
three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors must all be present to classify a state law as one that
regulates insurance and holding that factors are merely considerations to be weighed in the
analysis).
165. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1006.  The Fought court’s burden-shifting approach is
remarkable because it does not alter the standard of review.  Rather, it shifts the burden of proof
between the parties: if there is no inherent or serious conflict in the Tenth Circuit, the plan
participant must prove that the plan administrator abused its discretion; if the conflict of interest
is inherent or serious, the burden shifts to the plan administrator to prove that it did not abuse
its discretion.  In both circumstances, however, the question is not whether the decision to deny
the benefit was correct; the focus remains merely whether the decision was reasonable.
166. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58, § 543.  See generally Conison, supra note 34.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
4. Upholding Admittedly Wrong Claim Denials
The Fought court continued to invoke the arbitrary and capricious standard
even where burden-shifting is applied because Fought merely requires that a
seriously conflicted plan administrator establish that its claim denial was
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Under the new burden-
shifting approach, then, the review standard remains deferential, even though
the court shifted the burden to the plan administrator to prove that it did not
abuse its discretion in denying a benefits claim.   By adhering to the arbitrary165
and capricious review standard even under burden-shifting, Fought continues
the practice of requiring Tenth Circuit courts to uphold some claim denials that
would otherwise be overturned if reviewed de novo.
It is bad public policy for courts to bless incorrect findings and to sanction
judgments that reach incorrect conclusions.  As discussed below, application
of the no-further-inquiry rule to ERISA benefit claims will relieve courts from
the confounding problem of trying to define intermediate levels of deferential
review while also producing the salutary effect of allowing courts to seek out
correct results.
III. Trust Law Offers a Solution
A. The Trust Law No-Further-Inquiry Rule
The preeminent characteristic of a trust relationship is the duty of loyalty
owed by the trustee to trust beneficiaries.   Section 170 of the Restatement166
(Second) of Trusts provides that: “[t]he trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”167
A trustee’s duty of loyalty may be compromised when the fiduciary suffers a
self-dealing conflict of interest.  Consequently, trust law generally prohibits
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168. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58, § 543.
169. See Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (quoted supra at text
accompanying notes 13-14).
170. Id.
171. Id.  The popular name of the rule stems from this irrebuttable presumption of taint: once
a beneficiary establishes a fiduciary’s self-dealing conflict, courts will not inquire further into
the asserted good faith of the fiduciary, but will void the transaction at the request of the
beneficiary without seeking evidence of actual causation.  See Langbein, supra note 12, at 931.
172. See, e.g., Thorp v. McCullum, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 614 (1844); Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns.
Ch. 252 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
173. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 931 (citing Piatt v. Longworth’s Devisees, 27 Ohio St.
159, 195-96 (1875)); see also Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1966).
174. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
175. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 58, § 543 (“It is not possible for any person to act
fairly in the same transaction on behalf of himself and in the interest of the trust beneficiary.”);
Langbein, supra note 12, at 933-35; see also In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923-34 (N.Y.
1943) (“The [no-further-inquiry] rule is founded in the highest wisdom.  It recognizes the
infirmity of human nature, and interposes a barrier against the operation of selfishness and
greed.  It discourages fraud by taking away motive for its perpetration.  It tends to insure fidelity
on the part of the trustee . . . to a large class of persons whose estates . . . are intrusted to the
management of others.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
176. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 944-47.
177. See id.; see also John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A
the trustee from operating under a conflict of interest and self-dealing in trust
property.168
When a trustee pursues a course of action that implicates self-interest, the
common law no-further-inquiry rule relieves a complaining trust beneficiary
of the burden of proving that the conflicted trustee’s bias caused the trustee to
neglect the beneficiary’s sole interests.   Under the no-further-inquiry rule,169
if a trust beneficiary establishes a trustee’s conflict of interest, the beneficiary
can nullify the discretionary act or transaction.   Further, a court will prohibit170
the conflicted trustee from offering evidence to show that the alleged bias did
not drive its decision-making, or that the transaction was fair and reasonable
despite the conflict.171
Courts have applied the no-further-inquiry rule against conflicted fiduciaries
for centuries  because fraud might have resulted from conflicted decision-172
making.   The rule proudly recognizes the sanctity of the fiduciary173
relationship  while cynically acknowledging that, where interests conflict,174
human nature suggests that a person will serve his or her own interests to the
detriment of others.175
Application of the no-further-inquiry rule’s irrebuttable presumption also
acknowledges the difficulty of proving a conflicted trustee’s selfish
motivations or state of mind.   This principle reflects the rule’s equitable176
origins, which predate the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.177
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Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620 (1974).
178. As stated by Circuit Judge Becker in an ERISA benefits case, “this is not a scenario
where a ‘smoking gun’ is likely to surface, and direct evidence of a conflict [affecting the plan
administrator] is rarely likely to appear in any plan administrator’s decision.”  Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co.,
45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995).
179. Langbein, supra note 12, at 982.
180. Id. at 933-34.
181. See id. at 951-52, 976.
182. Id. at 954-57.
183. Id. at 959-60.
184. Id. at 951-52.  Professor Langbein candidly admits that his proposal confronts a long
and strong commitment to rigorously enforce the no-further-inquiry rule.  See id. at 931-32; see
Even with today’s modern discovery rules, proving that self-interest motivated
a fiduciary’s actions presents a significant hurdle.178
Eminent trust law and ERISA scholar Professor John H. Langbein recently
published a critique of the no-further-inquiry rule, calling the underlying
mantra that trustees must protect the sole interest of the trust beneficiary
“unsound.”   Professor Langbein’s proposed modification to the sole interest179
rule is perhaps not so radical.  In fact, he merely urges that courts re-cast the
trustee’s obligation as a duty to pursue the “best” rather than the “sole”
interests of trust beneficiaries, and replace the irrebuttable presumption of the
no-further-inquiry rule with a rebuttable presumption.180
Although Professor Langbein’s critique of the no-further-inquiry rule only
mentions ERISA in passing,  this comment employs Professor Langbein’s181
work to support the view that courts should apply the irrebuttable presumption
of the no-further-inquiry rule to ERISA benefit claims. Application of the no-
further-inquiry rule counsels a de novo review standard, which would return
trial courts to the business of deciding cases based upon admissible evidence.
B. Rebuttable and Irrebuttable Presumptions
The foundational tenet of Professor Langbein’s proposal is that when a
trustee pursues the most favorable investment strategies or transactions for
trust beneficiaries, conflicts of interest occasionally cause no harm.182
Professor Langbein envisions win/win conflict-laden transactions that
simultaneously protect the best interests of both the trust beneficiaries and
trustees.   Professor Langbein expresses concern that rigorous adherence to183
the no-further-inquiry rule can produce disincentives for well-meaning
trustees.  Trustees who trade in trust property at fair market value may be
forced to sacrifice reasonable profits many years after a transaction when what
appeared to be a good trade for beneficiaries at the time of the deal, also turned
out to produce a gain for the trustee.184
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also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); supra notes 13-14.
185. Langbein, supra note 12, at 944-47.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-55; JOHN P. DAWSON, A
HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 154-59 (1960); 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 353-69 (3d ed. 1944)).
188. Id. at 947.
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
Professor Langbein argues that the no-further-inquiry rule should be
abandoned in favor of a rebuttable presumption because the practical
foundations for the no-further-inquiry rule, as it developed in courts of equity,
no longer exist.   Historically, equity courts worried that an opportunistic185
trustee’s self-dealing might easily be concealed.   At the time, interested186
parties were incompetent to give evidence, and no reasonable discovery was
available to investigate a trustee’s hidden motivations.   Moreover, Professor187
Langbein reports that equity court trials were conducted on a paper record
where witnesses did not give live testimony and litigants did not enjoy the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine their adversaries.  Professor
Langbein suggests that modern discovery rules and evidence rules render these
concerns obsolete.188
ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries can only wish it were so.
Because modern courts process ERISA benefit claims in a manner that recalls
the failures of equity courts prior to their unification with courts of law and
prior to the enactment of modern rules of civil procedure.  Professor
Langbein’s exposition arguably supports the foundational need for the no-
further-inquiry rule in the summary adjudicative system courts have devised
for ERISA claims.
C. ERISA’s Summary Adjudicative Process
ERISA provides an express remedy, which can be pursued in either state or
federal court, that allows a plan participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
due under an ERISA plan.   The statute suggests an action governed by the189
rules of civil procedure; nowhere does ERISA expressly contemplate the
abbreviated, appellate-type process that trial courts have designed to treat
ERISA benefit claims so differently than any other lawsuit.  Quite the
contrary, ERISA’s legislative history indicates that Congress considered a
provision requiring parties to arbitrate benefit disputes, only to reject that
option in favor of providing plan participants a range of remedies and
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190. See H.R. 2, 93 Cong. § 691, at 566-68 (1974) (as passed by the Senate), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 3813-15; 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 4769. 
191. See Bogan, supra note 8, at 691 n.279.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
193. See, e.g., Perry v. Simplicity, 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).  But see Van Boxel v.
Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 1987) (expressing caution
at the wholesale importation of administrative agency concepts into the review of ERISA
fiduciary decisions).
194. See DeBofsky, supra note 9; Bogan, supra note 10.
195. The summary process is employed in ERISA actions arising from claims for benefits
due under a plan that grants discretionary powers to the plan administrator.  See Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
196. See Crespo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 294 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(noting that although many courts claim to decide ERISA claims on summary judgment,
summary judgment is usually not appropriate due to the numerous factual issues that remain
unresolved when the trial court conducts its non-evidentiary hearing to decide whether the plan
administrator abused its discretion).
197. After Firestone, most plan documents include a clause which gives the plan
administrator sole discretion to interpret plan provisions and to make eligibility determinations.
See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 373, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).
198. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 440-42 (Jane Kheel Stanley et al. eds., 2d ed. Supp.
2002).
199. See id. at 423-24.  ERISA requires plans to include an internal appeals process.  29
U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
guaranteed access to federal courts.   Congress also declined to establish an190
administrative process similar to social security.191
Despite this legislative history and the express remedy provided in ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B),  federal courts not only defer to plan administrator192
claim denials under the arbitrary and capricious review standard, but they have
also invented a summary procedure to decide ERISA benefits claim.   While193
some commentators have questioned the legitimacy of this summary
adjudicative process,  it continues to dominate employee benefit claims194
litigation.195
Courts do not typically try ERISA benefit claims in the traditional manner;
rather, the procedure is perhaps best described as a “trial on the papers.”196
First, the plan participant presents a claim to the plan administrator.  Then, the
administrator investigates the claim by gathering witness statements, medical,
employment and other documents, including the plan documents, much like
an insurance claims adjuster.   The conflicted administrator then determines197
whether or not to approve the claim based upon this unsworn “administrative
record.”   If the administrator denies the claim, it notifies the plan participant198
of the claim denial and its reasons for rejecting the claim.  Then, the
administrator advises the participant of his or her internal appeal rights.199
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200. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 198, at 425-29.
201. See id. at 423-24.
202. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 198, at 432-
34.
203. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 198, at 440-42.  Rules of evidence do not
pertain to the plan administrator’s gathering of the administrative record, and when this same
administrative record is produced in court, no attempt is made to apply rules of evidence to the
administrative record.  See id. at 456.  Consequently, the administrative record is comprised
mostly of unsworn statements and documents generated without regard to foundational niceties.
204. See id. at 434-35.
205. See, e.g., Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 436 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2006); Hall v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002); Perlman v. Swiss Bank
Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1999); Woolsey v.
Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing cases); see also EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW, supra note 198, at 440-42.
206. See, e.g., Wardle v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir.
1980); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 198, at 405-06; Bogan, supra note 8, at
685-93.
207. See, e.g., Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981-82 (“It follows from the conclusion that review of
UNUM’s decision is deferential that the district court erred in permitting discovery into
UNUM’s decision-making. There should not have been any inquiry into the thought processes
of UNUM’s staff, the training of those who considered Perlman’s claim, and in general who
said what to whom within UNUM . . . . Deferential review of an administrative decision means
review on the administrative record.”); Woolsey, 934 F.2d at 1455.
On appeal, the plan participant can usually submit further documentation
in support of the claim.   If the internal appeals panel affirms the claim200
denial, the plan administrator notifies the plan participant and provides the
specific basis for the denial.   After exhausting internal appeals, the plan201
participant can sue to recover benefits due under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B).202
The process then continues absent the hallmarks of a traditional civil
lawsuit.  Instead of conducting discovery and then presenting admissible
evidence before the trial judge or jury, the parties submit the administrator’s
claim file to the trial court as the “administrative record.”   When the plan203
administrator enjoys discretionary authority, the court examines this
administrative record to determine whether the plan administrator abused its
discretion in denying the claim.   Typically, the court prohibits evidence204
outside the administrative record;  the plan participant cannot testify or205
obtain a trial by jury,  and his or her lawyer cannot confront and cross-206
examine the plan administrator or other adverse witnesses.   The summary207
adjudicative process utilized in ERISA benefit claims evokes memories of the
paper trials equity courts conducted years ago that generated the need for the
no-further-inquiry rule.  The modern, court-invented process governing
ERISA benefit claims, boasting paper trials on limited, unsworn administrative
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208. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
209. 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).  As previously
discussed, in Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 147 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in
part & rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the Third Circuit appears to have enforced the no-
further-inquiry rule, sub silentio.  See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
210. In the Eleventh Circuit, if there is a conflict, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to
demonstrate that the denial was not tainted by self-interest.  See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566-67.
If this burden is not met, the court will reverse a decision that it would find wrong under a de
novo standard of review.  See id. at 1560-61, 1567 n.12.  The Eleventh Circuit burden-shifting
formula applies, however, only if the court disagrees with the administrator’s decision and
interpretation of the plan; if the court deems the decision to be legally correct, the inquiry ends.
See HCA Health Serv. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 993-94 & n.23
(11th Cir. 2001).
211. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565; see also Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323
(9th Cir. 1995) (“Under the common law of trusts, any action taken by a trustee in violation of
a fiduciary obligation is presumptively void. . . . Where the affected beneficiary has come
forward with material evidence of a violation of the administrator's fiduciary obligation, we
should not defer to the administrator's presumptively void decision.  In that circumstance, the
plan bears the burden of producing evidence to show that the conflict of interest did not affect
the decision to deny benefits.  If the plan cannot carry that burden, we will review the decision
de novo, without deference to the administrator's tainted exercise of discretion.” (citation
omitted)); see also Bruch, 828 F.2d at 147 (arguably applying the no-further-inquiry rule as a
matter of common sense, without expressly identifying the rule by its popular name).
records, produces the same need for application of the no-further-inquiry rule
today as existed in the relatively ancient courts of equity that developed the
doctrine.
D. In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit Alluded to the No-Further-Inquiry Rule
ERISA incorporates the trust law duty of loyalty by requiring plan
fiduciaries to administer ERISA plans solely for the benefit of plan
participants and their beneficiaries.   Despite Firestone and despite208
Congress’s pronouncement that trust law governs ERISA plan fiduciaries, no
circuit court of appeals has expressly applied the no-further-inquiry rule to an
ERISA benefits case.  Immediately following Firestone, however, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit flirted with the no-further-inquiry
rule in Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.   Analysis of the209
Brown opinion illustrates why courts should indeed apply the no-further-
inquiry rule in ERISA benefit claims.
In Brown, the Eleventh Circuit recited the substance of the no-further-
inquiry rule in support of its application of a burden-shifting approach.210
However, the Brown court applied a rebuttable, rather than an irrebuttable,
presumption that self interest motivated the conflicted trustee.   Further, the211
Brown court’s leniency toward conflicted plan administrators resulted from the
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212. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (7th
Cir. 1987); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 521 n.2 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Section 502(a)(1)(B) deals exclusively with contractual rights under the plan.”);
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985) (claims under § 502(a)(1)(B)
seek contractually authorized benefits).
213. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1558.
214. Id. at 1559.
215. Id. at 1561.  The administrative record apparently established that Blue Cross & Blue
Shield both funded the plan and administered claims, which the Eleventh Circuit labeled as
producing an inherent conflict of interest.  Id. at 1562.  The court also, in contrast, referenced
other cases where an insurer administered claims, but did not actually fund approved benefits.
In those cases the Eleventh Circuit imposed the highest level of deference because it found no
conflict of interest.  Id. at 1561-63, 1563 n.5 (citing Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala.,
Inc., 890 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1989); Hoover v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 855 F.2d
1538 (11th Cir. 1988)).
216. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561.
217. Id. at 1565 (quoting Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1966))
(emphasis in original).
court’s misunderstanding of the contract-based rights that motivate employee
benefits.212
Brown involved a health care benefits claim that the dual role plan
insurer/administrator denied based upon its conclusion that Mr. Brown’s
hospital admission, for which he did not obtain pre-admission approval, did
not qualify as an emergency, and therefore did not escape the pre-certification
requirements of the plan.   The insurer had discretionary authority, causing213
the arbitrary and capricious review standard to apply.   Nevertheless, this214
standard became subject to modification due to the insurer/plan administrator’s
inherent financial conflict of interest.215
As the Brown court struggled to “develop a coherent method for integrating
factors such as self-interest” into the review standard,  it recited the no-216
further-inquiry rule as the historical precedent for folding conflicts of interests
into the standard of review analysis:
“[T]he beneficiary need only show that the fiduciary allowed
himself to be placed in a position where his personal interest might
conflict with the interest of the beneficiary.  It is unnecessary to
show that the fiduciary succumbed to this temptation, that he acted
in bad faith, that he gained an advantage, fair or unfair, that the
beneficiary was harmed. Indeed, the law presumes that the
fiduciary acted disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is
foreclosed.”217
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218. Id.
219. Id. at 1566-67.
220. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
221. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566-67 (emphasis added).  The Brown court found that ERISA
plan administrators “are obligated to act not only in the best interests of beneficiaries, but with
due regard for the preservation of trust assets.”  Id. at 1567-68 (quoting DeNobel v. Vitro Corp.,
885 F.2d 1180, 1191 (4th Cir. 1989)).
222. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 521 n.2 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985).
223. See Brown, 828 F.2d at 1567-68; see also Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d
1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991) (seemingly approving plan trustee’s “balancing of interests between
[a] present claimant[] . . . and future claimants.” (quoting Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan
& Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (10th Cir. 1988) (alterations in original))).
224. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1568.  ERISA’s vesting rules do not apply to welfare plans;
consequently, an employer can terminate welfare plans at will.  See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995).  However, to the extent a plan participant has become
eligible for benefits under an existing plan, the right to receive such benefits vests pursuant to
Rather than recognizing that “inquiry into such matters is foreclosed,”218
however, the Brown court held that when a plan beneficiary establishes the
plan administrator’s “substantial” conflict of interest, the burden shifts to the
fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions “was not tainted by
self-interest.”   If the Brown court had applied the irrebuttable presumption219
of taint pursuant to the no-further-inquiry rule, the plan administrator would
not have been offered the opportunity to explain away its presumed bias.
Instead, de novo review would have applied, requiring the parties and the court
to focus on the substantive merits of the claim.
Brown’s failure to apply the irrebuttable presumption appears to have arisen
from the court’s confusion of an ERISA plan with a donative trust.   The220
Brown court declared that “a wrong but apparently reasonable interpretation
is arbitrary and capricious if it advances the conflicting interest of the fiduciary
at the expense of the affected beneficiary or beneficiaries unless the fiduciary
justifies the interpretation on the ground of its benefit to the class of all
participants and beneficiaries.221
The Brown court’s willingness to discriminate against an individual
claimant for the perceived good of other plan participants fails to recognize a
worker’s underlying contract right to receive promised benefits.   The Brown222
court held that an administrator owes a duty to protect an ERISA plan trust
from depletion of its assets.   Additionally, the court seemed concerned with223
the cost of paying claims.  Because employers voluntarily sponsor employee
benefit plans, the Brown court worried that if insurance premiums rose
significantly due to payment of claims, the employer might discontinue
sponsoring benefit plans.224
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the plan contract and cannot be terminated by the employer.  See Bland v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc.,
401 F.3d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 2005).  While the possibility that a plan sponsor may decide to
terminate a welfare plan in the future due to exorbitant costs is a real concern for all covered
workers, plan participants with vested contract rights to recover benefits should not have their
claims threatened by a court’s concern for workers who do not have current vested rights.  If
an employer decides to limit benefits in the future, workers would know that prior to becoming
eligible for benefits and could seek other employment with better fringe benefits if they are
unhappy with the employer’s actions in reducing its benefits package — that is not an option
for the plan participant with a ripened claim.
225. See S. 4, 93d Cong., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 91
(introductory remarks of Sen. Williams) (“Because vesting of rights to a worker without
adequate funding is an empty promise, our bill will require funding of all pension benefit
liabilities over a 30-year period . . . .”).
226. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
227. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1558, 1567.  The Brown opinion did draw a distinction “between
plans that are truly trusts and plans that are based solely on contracts or policies for insurance.”
Id. at 1567 (“Decisions on behalf of a plan in the form of a trust lend themselves less readily
to the accusation of conflicting interests and are more easily justified.”).  When a plan is fully
insured, claims decisions “inherently implicate the hobgoblin of self-interest.”  Id. at 1568.
Here the Brown court then made seemingly contradictory statements.  The court first said that
In a donative trust, a trustee is often required to distribute finite assets
among multiple gift beneficiaries while taking into account the competing
demands on the trust, because a distribution to one beneficiary necessarily
reduces the available funds for distribution to the remaining beneficiaries.
This concern is generally absent in the commercial context of an ERISA plan.
Even if a plan is funded through a trust, the trust is merely a funding device
that secures contractually promised benefits supported by mutual
consideration.  The ERISA trust, when present, helps guarantee that plan
sponsors will live up to their contractual obligations to provide defined
benefits, by assuring that some money will be available to pay such claims.
However, a plan’s legal obligation to pay contract benefits to eligible plan
beneficiaries is not limited by insufficient funding.   In contrast to a donative225
trust that is capped by the amount the settlor contributed to establish the trust
res, there is no limit or cap on the amount of benefits a plan sponsor may have
to pay through a defined benefit ERISA plan.   Consequently, one plan226
beneficiary’s legal rights to receive benefits are unaffected by the legal rights
other plan beneficiaries may also have to receive benefits under the same plan.
The Brown court did not recognize that employers must pay those benefits
out of their general treasury if an ERISA plan is not adequately funded.  As a
result, the court mistakenly treated the plan as a donative trust, which operates
under the constraints of a limited trust res.  The Brown opinion enigmatically
accepted this analysis despite the fact that the plan in question was fully
insured.   The court accepted that an insurer acts in good faith when denial227
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
682 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:637
“[t]he presumption that the fiduciary is acting for the future stability of the fund cannot be
entertained” in the fully-insured plan circumstance.  Id.  However, the court immediately
followed that sentiment with the statement: “Of course, the facts may bear out an insurance
company’s assertion that its interpretation of its policy is calculated to maximize the benefits
available to plan participants and beneficiaries at a cost that the plan sponsor can afford (or will
pay).”  Id.  Ultimately, the Brown court remanded the action to the district court because the
record did not contain evidence that would “demonstrat[e] that Blue Cross adopted its plan
interpretations exclusively for the benefit of the plan participants and beneficiaries.”  Id. at
1569.
228. Presumably, the plan insurer’s actuaries considered the risk that benefits would have
to be paid when the insurer quoted its premium cost to the employer.  But see Fought v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (suggesting that an
insurance company’s costs should somehow figure into the court’s consideration into whether
a claim denial should be upheld), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005).
229. Langbein, supra note 12, at 932-33.
230. See id. at 933, 958-62; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-08 (1939)
(recognizing the fairness rule).
231. When a plan is fully insured, state insurance law presumptions and burdens of proof
should also impact ERISA benefits claims.  See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1007 & n.4.
232. Langbein, supra note 12, at 933.
233. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, 1 THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE ch. 1 (5th ed. 1998).
is motivated by a fear of rising costs.   This practice mocks the conflict of228
interest analysis, and does not justify a court’s failure to apply the irrebuttable
presumption of taint required under the no-further-inquiry rule.
E. De Novo Review Under the No-Further-Inquiry Rule
As previously discussed, Professor Langbein would allow a conflicted
fiduciary to rebut the presumption of taint arising from the fact of a modern
fiduciary’s self-dealing conflict of interest.   In support of his suggested229
departure from the no-further-inquiry rule, Professor Langbein relies, at least
in part, upon modern corporation law’s abandonment of the no-further-inquiry
rule when dealing with conflicted corporate directors in favor of a fairness
standard.   While this article suggests that the no-further-inquiry rule should230
apply in ERISA cases, the result urged here is that courts apply de novo review
in ERISA claims.   This approach produces the same result as applied under231
the fairness standard, which Professor Langbein endorses.232
When a corporate fiduciary suffers a conflict of interest, the fairness
standard operates as an exception to court deference under the business
judgment rule.   Under the business judgment rule, if a non-conflicted233
corporate director engages in a transaction:
with due care, good faith, and in the honest belief that they are
acting in the best interest of the stockholders . . . , the Court gives
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234. Id. at 21 (first and third alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
235. Id. at 29, 41-74.
236. See id. at 30.
237. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
238. Professor Langbein suggested that courts modified how trust law controlled corporate
fiduciaries because of the “mercenary” nature of for-profit corporations.  See Langbein, supra
note 12, at 960-61; see also 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 233, at 9-11.  Contrasting the review
applied in trust law to modern corporation law, he identified three principles that corporation
law emphasizes in dealing with conflicted corporate fiduciaries: “disclosure, delegation, and
fairness.”  Langbein, supra note 12, at 959.  Corporate directors must disclose any personal
conflicts of interest that impact a corporate transaction.  Id.  Additionally, a conflicted director
must also delegate authority to non-conflicted directors to control the corporation transaction
by abstaining from voting on a proposed corporate action potentially impacted by the director’s
personal conflict.  See id. at 960-62.  Further, the neutral fiduciaries must examine the
transaction under a standard that ensures fairness to the corporation and its stockholders.  See
id. at 959.
239. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 233, at 28-29.
great deference to the substance of the director[’s] decision and will
not invalidate the decision, will not examine its reasonableness, and
will not substitute [its] views for those of the board if the latter’s
decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.234
However, such deference is inapposite where a corporate fiduciary suffers a
conflict of interest.   A corporate fiduciary’s self-dealing conflict of interest235
prompts application of the fairness standard.  Under this fairness standard,
courts do not defer to conflicted corporate fiduciary decisions.   Instead,236
courts impose an “exacting” burden on conflicted corporate fiduciaries,
requiring the fiduciary “to establish that the transaction attacked was on terms
entirely fair to the corporation or . . . to the corporation’s stockholders.”237
Though Professor Langbein did not contrast how courts review ERISA
claims with the fairness standard, because his recent article was not focused
on ERISA, it is of particular significance here to make that comparison.238
Application of  the fairness standard in corporation law voids the deference
courts normally apply to corporate fiduciary actions and substitutes a de novo
evaluation by the court to determine, after hearing evidence concerning the
overall transaction, whether the challenged action was entirely fair.239
Similarly, courts deciding ERISA benefits claims involving conflicted plan
administrators should hear evidence under a de novo standard of review.
The varying and often complicated processes that the circuits employ in
ERISA claims demonstrates the urgent need to find a uniform, simple, and just
review process. The lower courts are constrained, however, by the Supreme
Court’s instruction in Firestone to apply a trust law-based standard of review
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in ERISA claims litigation. Application of the no-further-inquiry rule allows
courts to escape the frustration of trying to apply intermediate levels of
deferential review by requiring simple de novo review.  Such a result would
be fair to all parties and comports with Firestone.  Because plan participants
and plan administrators should each enjoy the right to a de novo trial on the
merits, this article urges courts to apply the trust law-based no-further-inquiry
rule in conflict-laden ERISA benefit claims in order to guarantee real de novo
review in employee benefits claim litigation.
IV. Conclusion
In Firestone, the Supreme Court instructed trial courts to apply a trust law-
based standard of review in claims for benefits due under an ERISA plan.
Following Firestone, lower courts have routinely applied some aspects of trust
law in ERISA claims.  Regrettably, they have not adhered to trust law’s no-
further-inquiry rule in the analysis of what standard of review to apply in
ERISA benefits claims litigation tarnished by a plan administrator’s conflict
of interest. The abbreviated adjudicative process, which courts employ in
ERISA benefit cases, mirrors the evidentiary problems that originally
motivated development of the no-further-inquiry rule.  This same trust law rule
should be enforced by courts today to rid the court system of the perplexing
search for a modified deferential review standard.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/4
